Greater Cambridge Local Plan Preferred Options

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Greater Cambridge Local Plan Preferred Options

S/DS: Development strategy

Representation ID: 60051

Received: 17/12/2021

Respondent: Cambridge Connect

Representation Summary:

Our group, in collaboration with Railfuture and a wide range of others, has prepared detailed proposals and commentary of high relevance to the Local Plan. We would appreciate it if our report could be considered as part of Local Plan discussions.

Full text:

Our group, in collaboration with Railfuture and a wide range of others, has prepared detailed proposals and commentary of high relevance to the Local Plan. We would appreciate it if our report could be considered as part of Local Plan discussions.

A lot of work has gone into it, and we have a lot of support from residents throughout Cambridge and the surrounding region. The report has been submitted to the Making Connections consultation, and also to the Combined Authority Transport strategy consultation.

I think it is worth mentioning that most residents find it very difficult to navigate the intricacies of local planning processes, and having (at least) three significant consultations running at the same time by three different bodies with overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities makes it especially confusing. This makes it especially difficult for democratic input by those not in the system, and for fully inclusive consultations. Our planning authorities should give this close consideration and ensure there are improvements in coordination in future.

We hope you will make an exception on this occasion and accept our report into the process 4 days late.

Cambridge Connect Cambridgeshire Light Rail Strategy
Submission to Cambridgeshire & Peterborough Combined Authority

28 Nov 2021
railfuture
EAST ANGLIA
cambndge connecT

Executive summary 5
1. Introduction 11
2. Scheme influences 12
3. Population 13
4. Economy 16
5. Education 17
6. Commuter demand 18
7. Tourism demand 18
8. Non-commuter demand 19
9. Network model 20
10. Cambridgeshire Light Rail 21
11. Urban realm 24
12. Environment 25
13. Health 27
14. Heritage 27
15. Accessibility 27
16. Tunnel 29
17. Costs 30
18. Cost comparisons 31
19. Revenue 32
20. Financing 32
21. Is Cambridge too small? 34
22. Existing GCP transport measures 36
23. Light rail and busways compared 37
24. Community engagement 39
Cambourne to Cambridge – C2C 39
Addenbrookes to Granta Park – CSET 41
25. Team – Brief bios 42
26. Declarations of interest 45
27. Appendices 46

Cover images: The transport strategy needs to address the challenges of population growth and climate change and help secure the health, safety and welfare of present and future generations.
Citation: Cambridge Connect / Railfuture. 2021. Cambridgeshire Light Rail Strategy. Submission to Cambridgeshire & Peterborough Combined Authority consultation on Transport and Connectivity Plan.

and Cambridge North stations, and in future at Cambridge South and Cambourne. The lines would share a short single tunnel of ~2.6 km in Cambridge City.
26. We recognise plans for major developments on the east side of Cambridge, and anticipate extending lines there at Phase Three. We anticipate this component of the network would be elaborated as plans for the east of Cambridge are more fully developed. The network is designed so an eastern extension can be easily incorporated.
27. We recognise the tunnel increases investment needs, although we note that it would also deliver major increased benefits. In particular, it enables a fully integrated and segregated light rail route across the region, allowing integrated, fast and reliable services to the city core and to all major employment sites around Cambridge.
28. The tunnel addresses critical practical constraints of space and the river barrier in the centre of Cambridge, and while more expensive it would repay the investment.
29. The tunnel is likely to be more deliverable than a surface solution because of vital heritage and environmental constraints in Cambridge: strong public opposition to mass transit through the inner city at the surface seems likely.
30. The tunnel enables improvements to the urban realm, and in particular frees up space for improvements to support active travel - cycling lanes and pedestrianisation. It also makes the urban realm safer for pedestrians and cyclists by removing much heavy transport infrastructure. It would greatly reduce pollution at the surface, including from particulates produced by rubber tyred buses.
31. The tunnel enables rapid access to the city core, providing a practical and efficient alternative to people so they can leave cars at home. Moreover, the alternative is more likely to make demand measures such as a Congestion Charge or Workplace Parking Levy more acceptable to the public.
32. The network is designed to support all of the major employment/ residential/ educational/ and health centres across Cambridge. In particular the Darwin Line supports the northern part of the city such as Arbury and Kings Hedges, dramatically improving social inclusion and opportunities in a relatively deprived part of Cambridge.
33. The network provides and improves access for all sectors of the community to key facilities, and to wider transport links. Phase Three extensions will develop this further, including links to the east and north, including to Bar Hill (currently poorly served) and the expanding centre of Northstowe. In time, we envisage the northern busway would be converted to light rail, although this is not put forward as an immediate priority.
34. The network is designed to protect key landscapes surrounding Cambridge by following existing major transport routes such as the A428 to the Girton Interchange, and in the south following the former rail route to Haverhill. The network thus offers greater protection to the environment than plans being put forward by the GCP for the CSET and C2C schemes, while also offering greater transport and economic benefits.
35. The Girton Interchange has been identified as a key strategic node on the regional transport network. There are opportunities to locate a coach station at this site, linked to light rail, thus reducing the need for coaches and buses to enter the city centre. This would be a major benefit for the city and the tourist industry, as well as to coach companies who currently face major difficulties with congestion.


Connecting the campuses
36. The University of Cambridge and its colleges are pivotal to the success of the Cambridge Phenomenon. This is a rare and globally unique context that cannot be easily reproduced elsewhere. It should be celebrated and supported
37. The success has driven the University expansion into three distinct and separated sites: West Cambridge Campus and Eddington, the City Campus, and the Biomedical Campus.
38. Current transport links are now inadequate to support close interaction across these campuses and with the colleges. For the modern University of Cambridge, with its links to industry, there is a need to join up the campuses by effective and fast transport links, including to science and technology business clusters.
39. Joining up the campuses with good transport links is needed to maintain and strengthen cross-disciplinary interactions and research that are fundamental to Cambridge success. We believe the GCP City Access Strategy will not be adequate to meet these needs.
40. There is also the need to create good links between the University and centres of business activity, such as the Science Park, Babraham and Granta Park to name a few.
Why light rail?
41. Light rail is selected as the mode of choice for the mass transit backbone because it is proven to be more effective at driving modal shift than buses, and is more attractive as an alternative for car drivers. It is capable of delivering on the objectives of modal shift and on supporting the economy and growth coming forward in a way that buses cannot.
42. Light rail is well established and technically supported, with billions of miles of safe operation world-wide. There has been massive investment in the technology already and there is a very competitive supplier market. There are also options to support tram-train.
43. Light rail is environmentally superior with zero emissions at the street, including almost zero fine particulates (buses emit harmful fine particulates from tyre, road and brake wear) and no waste rubber tyres. Light rail eliminates these sources of pollution.
44. Light rail has a much lower overall lifetime carbon footprint than buses / busways.
45. Light rail has superior capacity, which future-proofs the system for Cambridge growth and will be able to meet the future needs for modal shift in a rapidly-changing economy.
46. Light rail is fast, reliable, frequent, comfortable, and affordable – it has all the ingredients needed to make it a genuinely attractive public transport alternative.
47. Modern light rail can operate driverless, extending hours and reducing costs.
48. Light rail has limitations in flexibility and reach, and this is why there remains a need for close integration with bus services, as well as with active travel, and cars. Beyond the backbone of mass transit and train lines, buses offer more flexibility and reach for public transport. With well-designed stops, active travel and other modes can work closely with mass transit. This approach is proven as successful in hundreds of cities world-wide.
49. The more limited flexibility of light rail may also be considered a benefit. It provides fixed and permanent infrastructure which is powerfully attractive to investment. This enables greater confidence in the local transport network, and thus locational decisions with greater value added.

Is Cambridge too small?
50. We show that many cities throughout Europe similar in size to Cambridge, and smaller, have successful light rail. It is clearly possible; the challenge is to change the UK narrative.
51. In the context of Cambridge economic activity, its role in the UK economy, pressures of growth, the need for major behavioural change because of climate change (modal shift), the need for the right capacity to meet demand, outstanding heritage and environmental values that need protection, and the range of options for investment, we believe Cambridge is not too small. We need to plan for needs in the 2030s and beyond now.
Costs and financing
52. We project a budget of £1.4 - £1.8 bn to deliver the Isaac Newton Line and the Darwin Line in Phases One and Two over a period of 4 to 8 years, which is similar to the recent A14 road upgrade.
53. The tunnel and underground station represents ~ one quarter of the proposed initial investment. It is important to deliver the tunnel early in the process so that significant benefits, and revenue, can start to be realised quickly. The tunnel could be built in less than a year based on the speed of tunneling achieved by Crossrail, so tunnel construction speeds should not be perceived as a major barrier.
54. Given the light rail schemes proposed would wholly replace the current GCP busway plans, it is reasonable to assume that City Deal funds could be redeployed, which could provide an initial base of ~£400M in finance.
55. It seems reasonable to assume a sizeable proportion of Devolution Deal funds for the Combined Authority could be allocated to the scheme.
56. Our budget includes the link from Granta Park to Haverhill, which is an expensive component outside of the current City Deal scope. This represents ~£250M, which could be funded through an alternative mechanism such as the Restore Your Railways fund.
57. This would leave ~ £1bn of additional funds to raise. While challenging, there are a range of finance mechanisms that could be deployed. These could include some or a combination of a Business Rates Supplement (as successfully employed for Crossrail), the new National Infrastructure Bank (loan or guarantee), Section 106, and bonds. Other mechanisms such as a Congestion Charge, Workplace Parking Levy, Land Value Capture could also be explored. Significant finance was raised for the Northern Line extension to Battersea using similar mechanisms.
58. While the additional investment is a challenge, it is important to recognise that unless any investment achieves the objectives of the intervention it will fail to realise the benefits to the community.
59. Under-investment runs a very real risk of failing to deliver on important priorities that are needed to transform transport in this region, specifically to address the twin challenges of growth and climate change. We believe the strategy put forward in this document would contribute substantially to improving our prospects of meeting those challenges.
60. We hope the Combined Authority for Cambridgeshire and Peterborough will find our submission helpful, and that the arguments put forward will be found compelling and given serious consideration. We are keen to cooperate to create a better future.

Summary appraisal of light rail vs busways for Cambridgeshire





Data source: Cambridgeshire County Council Research Group https://data.cambridgeshireinsight.org.uk/dataset/2018-based-population-and-dwelling-stock- forecasts-cambridgeshire-and-peterborough

Development Houses % Houses Residents1 % Residents Jobs %Jobs
Northstowe 9500 19 22800 19 3500 9
Waterbeach Barracks 8500 17 20400 17 5800 14
West Campus / Eddington 3000 6 7200 6 6800 17
Cambridge Northern Fringe 2950 6 7080 6 3600 9
Cambridge East 1700 3 4080 3 1000 2
Cambridge Southern Fringe 4400 9 10560 9 10500 26
Hinxton / Babraham / Granta Park 0 0 5200 13
Bourn Airfield 3500 7 8400 7
Cambourne West 1500 3 3600 3 2800 7
St Neots East 3700 7 8880 7
RAF Wyton 3750 7 9000 7
Alconbury Weald 5000 10 12000 10
Ely North 3000 6 7200 6
Cambridge City Centre1 0 0 1800 4
50500 100 121200 100 41000 100
Greater Cambridge City Deal website retrieved 03 Mar 2016
http://www.cambridgeshire.gov.uk/citydeal/info/2/transport/9/transport

SUMMARY

1. GCP information made no projection for city centre houses.
2. Residents based on average number of occupants per house = 2.4 (UK average, Office of National Statistics).

Development Houses Residents % of Total
Northstowe 6345 15228 13
Waterbeach Barracks 5330 12792 11
Cambridge Northeast 3900 9360 8
Marleigh 1300 3120 3
Cambridge East 2850 6840 6
Darwin Green 2478 5947 5
Eddington 3142 7541 6
Clay Farm 151 362 0.4
Bourn Airfield 2460 5904 5
Cambourne West 2590 6216 5
Cambourne 1950 4680 4
Trumpington Meadows 302 725 1
North of Cherry Hinton 1200 2880 2
Worts Causeway 430 1032 1
Great Shelford 100 240 0.3
Sawston 418 1003 1
Melbourne 140 336 0.4
Total 35086 84206

Carbone4 / Alstom 2016. Tramways or bus rapid transit: which is greener? A study of the lifecycle CO2 emissions of tramway & BRT systems.

U-ground (km) O-ground (km) Total (km) Stops2 U-ground
£M3 O-ground
£M4 Total £M
Isaac Newton Line Phase
One 2.6 17 19.7 16 392 529 921
Darwin Line Phase One - 2.2 2.2 3 - 57 57
Phase One subtotal 2.6 19.2 21.9 19 392 586 978
Isaac Newton Line Phase
Two - 11.7 11.7 4 - 295 295
Darwin Line Phase Two - 6.5 6.5 5 - 165 165
Phase Two subtotal - 18.2 18.2 9 - 460 460
Newton Line +
Darwin Line 2.6 37.4 40.1 28 392 1046 1438
1. Estimate includes lines, tunnel, 2x u-ground stations, surface stations, rolling stock, depot.
2. Existing Cambridge Central and Cambridge North Rail Stations and proposed Cambridge South Rail Station are counted as stops.
3. Underground costs based on £73.5 M/km and INCLUDES two underground stations @ £100M each. Published cost of underground Métropole Nice Côte D’Azur Line 2, Railway Gazette (Oct 2015) and estimated cost of 5 m diameter tunnel in Cambridge geology of
£73.5M/km for bi-directional tunnel.
4. Surface light rail cost of £20-30M /km B. Menzies (2015) quoted Cambridge News 03 Feb 2015. £25M/km used above.

Figure 17. Costs of light rail by network component.

£852m £1500

Year Cambridge Working
Residents Commuting
WITHIN
Cambridge /d Commuting
OUT OF
Cambridge /d Commuting
INTO
Cambridge /d Total INTO /
OUT &
WITHIN /d Commuter journeys To-
From = x2 /d
2011 60 000 44 000 16 000 51 000 111 000 222 000
2031 70 800 51 920 18 880 60 180 130 980 261 960


Journeys Per
day Journeys Per Year
(M) Journeys Per Year
(M) Revenue per year
(£M)

Year Total journeys
commuters /d
Total /y
By Light Rail 20% (20% of commuter journeys
by Light Rail, avg fare £2.00)
2011 222 000 55.5 11.1 22.2
2031 261 960 65.6 13.1 26.2


City Lines Stations Length (km) Popn Length / person (m)
Reims 1 23 11.2 182,592 0.061
Le Havre 2 23 13 172,074 0.075
Saint-Étienne 3 38 11.7 172,023 0.068
Grenoble 5 71 36 160,215 0.225
Dijon 2 35 19 153,003 0.124
Angers 1 25 12.3 150,125 0.082
Cambridge (City) 2 24 40 154,0502 0.260
Le Mans 2 35 18.9 144,244 0.131
Clermont-Ferrand 1 34 15.9 141,463 0.112
Brest 1 28 14.3 139,386 0.103
Tours 1 29 15.5 134,803 0.115
Besançon 2 31 14.5 116,952 0.124
Orléans 2 49 29.3 114,375 0.256
Mulhouse 3 29 16.2 112,063 0.145
Rouen 1 31 15.1 110,755 0.136
Caen 2 34 15.7 107,229 0.146
Nancy 1 28 11.1 104,072 0.107
Avignon 1 10 5.2 90,305 0.058
Aubagne 1 7 2.8 45,303 0.062
Valenciennes 2 48 33.8 42,851 0.789




Cambridge Lausanne
City population 125 000 (2011)
154 050 (2031) 125 759 (1991 opened)
146 372 (Nov 2015)
Regional population 350 000 (2031):
South Cambs (commuter basin) 309 000 (Mar 2015): Lausanne
commuter basin.
City area 40.7 km2 41.4 km2
Regional area 901.63 km2 ?
Modal share 8% (bus) 40% (includes metro & bus)
Number of lines Two (Isaac Newton + Darwin) Two (M1, M2). New line in devlpmt.
Number of stations 28 29
System length 40 km 13.7 km
Length underground ~2.6 km ~7.5 km
Length dedicated alignment 92% segregated. Mainly segregated.
Length on street Several street crossings at grade. Some street crossings at grade.
Service frequency Every 5-10 min. 3 min central; 6 min elsewhere.
Top / Average speed 80 / 33 km/h 60 km/h; Avg 20 km/h (M2)
Track gauge 1435 mm 1435 mm
Catenary-free? As appropriate M1 No; M2 Yes
Automatic operation Yes (eg Docklands Light Railway) M1 No; M2 Yes
Total cost Newton + Darwin ~£1.5 bn M2 £333M (2008)
Cost per km £37.5M /km M2 £56.4M /km
Passengers /year 13.1M (2031) 40M (2014)
Operating revenue (annual) £26.2M – assumed 13.1M pax
journeys @ £2.00 average fare. £100M – assumed 40M pax journeys
@ £2.50 average fare.
Typical fare ~£2 - £4 ~£4 peak 2h for two zones


22. Existing GCP transport measures

• Construct bus lanes/ busways to regional population centres - buses proceed to Cambridge city centre. GCP strategy plans a massive increase in bus traffic in the inner city narrow streets, competing with cyclists and pedestrians.
• City Access Strategy published in August 2021, but appears similar to proposals made seven years ago, which led to resistance and protest by city business and residents.
• Lack of means to link busway limbs together to form integrated network across the region. Buses therefore likely to suffer from congestion in city centre.
• Busway schemes lack capacity and are not future-proofed for the 2030s in view of the growth already coming forward.
• GCP proposed inner city road closure at peak time with a view to forcing people to take the bus. Strong concerns about this option being harmful for the city economy and business led to protests, and the proposal was scrapped several years ago.
• Strong community opposition to both CSET and C2C busways. High concern about unnecessary damage to Green Belt environment and amenity when potentially viable alternatives exist.
• Busway schemes not aligned with community aspirations or needs. Large numbers of buses in the city will degrade the quality of the environment of the city.
• Park & Ride expansions/ additions. Greenways and cycle route/ path improvements.
• Improve traffic signaling.
• Schemes constrained by funding available in the City Deal.
• Expenditure to date: ~£100M yet limited delivery after almost seven years.
• Significant difficulties experienced in delivery of larger GCP schemes and substantial community opposition. Likely to lead to costly challenges at Public Enquiries.
• The GCP strategy was developed prior to 2015, based on a model formulated for the previous busway.
• Major developments in the science and understanding of climate change have occurred since the GCP strategy was formulated. In particular there are new requirements for decarbonisation in order to meet agreed net-zero targets.
• These changes have very practical implications for how we need to change our behaviour, systems and infrastructure going forward. This is particularly the case for transport, which accounts for around one-third of emissions.
• Questions should be raised about whether the old strategy remains fit for purpose for the 2030s and beyond?
• The solutions put in place now must have capacity and resilience to meet the needs of future generations. We believe the evidence strongly suggests that busways will not be adequate to meet the twin challenges of growth and climate change in 2030s, nor be sufficient to support the continued growth of the regional economy.

Table 11. Summary appraisal of light rail vs busways for Cambridgeshire

Cambourne to Cambridge – C2C
comments made in the Independent Audit implying we should have undertaken more detailed appraisal to be fair: this is not our job as members of the public, but rather the job of the authorities responsible for bringing schemes forward. The GCP should properly investigate all reasonable alternatives before proceeding with a preferred route that will damage the Green Belt, and both i-Transport and the Independent Audit have concluded the A428 co-aligned route is a reasonable alternative for detailed consideration.
Moreover, the A428 co-alignment alternative is supported by many in the community, and by the American Cemetery, because it would protect more of the Green Belt at the same time as delivering an excellent public transport link (e.g. see Appendix Two, and as outlined below).
The route we propose via the Girton Interchange would take less than two minutes longer to get to Cambridge from Cambourne than the route preferred by the GCP. Balanced against this, the route ensures the public transport route is integrated with the Girton Interchange, which is one of the most strategically important road junctions in the region, connecting the Ml 1, A14 and A428 highways. This allows the public transport network to be connected to regional centres such as Bar Hill and (rapidly growing) Northstowe in the future, as well as enables development of an inter-regional coach/ bus station at the interchange connected by the light rail link into Cambridge and to surrounding centres.
It is important to note that routing the C2C public transport route via the Girton Interchange does NOT REQUIRE the road interchange itself to be fully enabled at this time. This could be undertaken in the future, or not at all, and this work is not necessary for the Girton Interchange route to be strategically beneficial:
• it keeps options open for the future;
• it allows for onward links to important centres like Bar Hill and Northstowe;
• it serves to protect environmental and community values which lie at the heart of the strong opposition to the GCP preferred C2C route; and
• it allows a regional coach station to be located at the Girton Interchange connected via a light rail link into the city, employment centres, health and educational facilities, and to surrounding communities.
The outline proposal for an alternative route for C2C submitted to the C2C Independent Audit by Cambridge Connect is provided in Appendix One.
In 2019 Cambridge Connect collaborated with the Coalition of Parish Councils to the west of Cambridge to agree a 'Letter of Community Consensus' on the Girton Interchange. This letter called for consideration of fully enabling an all-ways road junction at the Girton Interchange, and importantly also called for:
"the strategic importance of the Girton Interchange be fully recognised by ensuring it is integrated with any mass transit scheme taken forward to the west of Cambridge".
This 'Letter of Community Consensus' was supported by a wide range of MPs, District Councillors, Parish Councils and Community Groups across the region to the west and north of Cambridge, and was submitted to the Secretary of State for Transport and the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. It was copied to the Combined Authority, GCP and Highways England amongst other stakeholders. The community represented by the signatories comprises more than 30,000 residents. The letter is provided in Appendix Two.
Addenbrookes to Granta Park – CSET
Cambridge Connect and Railfuture have collaborated with the Great Shelford and Stapleford Parish Councils in development of the 'Shelford Rail Alignment (SRA)' alternative to the GCP's preferred route for CSET, including working with i-Transport in their technical assessment of the alternative. The rationale for the SRA alternative is in summary:
• Follows former railway line to Haverhill;
• Avoids further severance and damage to landscape adjacent to villages of Great Shelford and Stapleford, adjacent to the important regional ecological sites of the Gog Magog Hills, Wandlebury and Magog Downs and also the important landscape and amenity values of the River Granta in this locality;
• More directly serves the community by passing through the villages, with stops in the heart of the villages. This will offer better community access, and will be safer for users of the public transport rather than isolated in the countryside as proposed by the GCP;
• Closely connected to the mainline railway with a convenient interchange at Great Shelford.
The i-Transport report (2021) commissioned by the Parish Councils concluded that the GCP CSET route was brought forward based on a number of false assumptions suggesting the SRA was not feasible. The professional transport analysis made by i-Transport concluded that the route is feasible, although it is recognised that it might be more expensive and further work would need to be undertaken to consider properly all aspects of how it would operate and be optimised.
We support the i-Transport conclusions, and further suggest that work undertaken on the reinstatement of the railway to Haverhill would help further inform choices of the best option for public transport in this region. Moreover, this could show how a reinstated heavy rail line could work in combination with light rail. In this context, we consider the GCP has given insufficient consideration to these alternatives and has not demonstrated a necessity to cut across the Green Belt with a new alignment and major bridge on the River Granta in the way that is proposed.
Transport proposals in the vicinity of, and have the potential to impact, the villages of Great Shelford and Stapelford include CSET, East-West Rail, Cambridge South Station, Haverhill line reinstatement, and increasing frequency of trains on existing mainlines to serve the growing population. A key community concern in this context is the cumulative effect of all of these developments, and there is concern that schemes are being developed in silos. The regional transport strategy needs to consider the cumulative impacts and develop adequate mitigation. For example, the level crossings in these villages are becoming increasingly impractical because of the frequency of closures. Cambridge Connect and Railfuture have proposed grade separation of the mainline railway in Great Shelford should be brought forward, and planned and delivered as part of regional transport schemes.
Cambridge Connect and Railfuture made formal submissions to the GCP public consultation on CSET in 2019. The Cambridge Connect submission is provided in Appendix Three.

25. Team - Brief bios
Cambridge Connect is established as a small company and is currently operated on a voluntary basis. Work is undertaken in collaboration with a range of individuals, companies and organisations on an informal basis. Brief biographical sketches of individuals who have played substantive roles in the development of the Cambridge Connect concepts and proposals are provided below.
Dr Colin Harris PIEMA – Director, Cambridge Connect
Dr Colin Harris is Director of the environmental planning consultancy Environmental Research & Assessment, based in Cambridge. Colin was educated at the University of Otago (BA Hons, First), University of Western Ontario (MA), and University of Cambridge (PhD), specialising in environmental management and spatial planning. He has worked in this field for 25 years and is a Practitioner in the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment. His principal professional focus is on environment, sustainability and strategic spatial planning. Colin established Cambridge Connect Transit Ltd in 2015 to promote an evidence-led strategy to address Cambridge transport challenges. He has collaborated with a broad group of people to develop the evidence-base for light rail in Cambridge, and design of a segregated light rail network delivery strategy. He has published and presented widely on the subject.
Peter Wakefield – Vice-Chair, Railfuture East Anglia
Peter Wakefield was chair of Railfuture East Anglia until 2017, a role he held for over 20 years. In this role he advocated for public transport improvements, recognising the crucial link between a quality railway and sustainable economic development. For example, Peter pioneered the Railfuture campaign to restore East - West links between Cambridge and Oxford, an effort which is now close to practical delivery. Peter was closely involved in the successful campaign to establish a new station at Cambridge North, and for restoring the rail link to Wisbech. Peter has detailed knowledge of the rail industry, network and operations. Peter is interested in helping decision makers to make prudent forward-looking plans for the rail network and public transport services. Peter has played an key role on the Rail Freight Committee of Railfuture, has contributed to numerous submissions to government and consultations, and has been a spokesperson on topical issues. Peter has played the lead role in the Cambridge Connect initiative for Railfuture.

John Howland-Jackson – CEO, Nikko Asset Management Europe
John joined Nikko AM in 2014 and was appointed CEO in 2018. John is responsible for all aspects of the business across Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) and Nikko AM's continuing growth strategy. John has an extensive background in international capital markets in particular and has held senior executive positions with leading financial institutions over many years. Prior to joining Nikko, he spent almost 15 years with the Dutch ING Group as Head of its Wholesale Banking Operations in Japan, the Asia Pacific region and the UK & Middle East. Having started his career with the UK Merchant Bank Kleinwort Benson he has also worked for JP Morgan, Nomura Securities Group and the NatWest Group. John holds a BA in Jurisprudence from Oxford University and is a qualified Barrister­ at-Law (Inns of Court Law School and Middle Temple 1972).

Ian Brown CBE FCILT – Railfuture / UK Tram
In a career spanning over 40 years, Ian Brown has made an outstanding contribution to public transport and the rail industry in the UK and internationally. His extensive achievements include playing a leading role in establishing the Docklands Light Railway and the London Overground, the major extension of the East London Line, the integration of Croydon Tramlink into TfL and the expansion of Oyster 'pay as you go'. Ian retired as Managing Director of TfL's London Rail in 2011 after 10 years in the role, and was honoured with a CBE in 2011 for services to the railway industry. Ian is a Vice President of Railfuture, and is on National Board of Directors. As Director of Policy, Ian has been instrumental in determining Railfuture's policies at a strategic level and has written several of its submissions to the Department for Transport. Ian is also a Board Member of UK Tram and leads its Centre of Excellence programme.

Peter Cushing – UK Tram
Peter Cushing was until recently Director of Manchester Metrolink, with responsibility for the day to day operation and delivery of a £1.8bn capital programme, retiring in 2017. He has extensive operating experience at board level and working with senior local and central government bodies delivering major capital programmes in the UK and overseas. Peter provided leadership in migration/ transition planning, merger planning and organisation design in a variety of Light Rail Transit and Metro assignments in the UK and abroad. He has been a senior figure in other consultancy projects including operations and commercial analysis roles for DfT, and several major rail bids. Peter played a lead role in establishment of the UK Light Rail Safety Standards Board. He is presently advising Midland Metro, Edinburgh Trams and consulting internationally on light rail.

James Hanson – Ankura
James manages the EMEA Construction Advisory team. He is a Civil Engineer with over 20 years industry experience in managing large and complex capital projects. James specialises in advising and assisting clients in project development, risk strategy, project controls and in the selection of project team and contracting organisations. James has extensive experience in the transport sector with expert knowledge of the financial, contractual and supply chain risks involved in delivery of railway projects. He has advised on major contractual, commercial and technical risks associated with capital delivery, operation and maintenance of railway projects, and advised on time and budget management. He has undertaken risk management reviews of vendor construction contracts, pre and post signature. Prior to Ankura, James was Managing Director of Navigant's Global Construction Advisory practice which was acquired by Ankura in 2018. Previously James was a Partner at PwC and worked for both its UK and Middle East Capital Project & Infrastructure practices.

Misbah Uddin – Ankura
Misbah is a Managing Director at Ankura specialising in transport and infrastructure project and finance advisory with over 17 years of experience. He is a government advisory and PPP specialist with particular knowledge and experience of the transport sector and infrastructure finance. His global experience and expertise includes business case development and review, cost/financial modelling, benchmarking, project due diligence, and project structuring advice to procuring authorities as well as bid-side advice to investors and contractors. Notable past clients in the rail sector include the DfT, TfL, National Express, Dubai Roads & Transport Authority, RATP and various other public and private transport sector investors and operators. Prior to Ankura, Misbah worked for PwC in both its UK and


Middle East Corporate Finance and Capital Project & Infrastructure practices. Prior to that, he worked for Boaz Allen Hamilton advising clients on a wide range of UK and international transport projects.

David Moore – CMS
David Moore is a Partner in the Infrastructure & Projects Team at the law firm CMS Cameron McKenna Nabarro Olswang LLP. David read engineering at the University of Cambridge and gained professional qualifications at the Chester College of Law. David specialises in the development and operation of transport infrastructure and is a specialist in the rail sector. He has over 20 years' experience advising on the development and operation of rail infrastructure (including as a PPP), rail franchises (both bidding and during operations), rolling stock procurement (including maintenance arrangements), operational issues, rail regulation and industry arrangements. He also has extensive experience developing and operating other transport infrastructure and acts for both private sector and public sector clients in the UK and internationally. He has been recognised by the legal directories
as "a judicious and intellectually astute transport projects lawyer'.

Paul Hollinghurst – Railfuture
Paul Hollinghurst is Secretary of Railfuture East Anglia, and has played an active role in numerous transport projects, including feasibility studies and business cases relating to reinstatement of railways to Wisbech and Haverhill. Paul has written analysis reports for Railfuture on topical issues, and has been a regular contributor to Rail East. He is a resident of Cambridge with first hand local knowledge and extensive practical experience of public transport services. Paul is an engineer for a semiconductor company working on SG mobile phone chip technologies.

Dr Mark Brown – Amey
Mark is Development Director of Arney's Consulting and Rail business where he leads strategic planning. He was previously Group Development Director at Halcrow. Mark is an economist with 30 years' experience in the transport sector. He has worked on a wide variety of highway, rail and development projects in over 20 countries and is widely published in project economics, rail planning and asset management. Mark is a director of the Wales and Borders Train Operating Company that is responsible for train operations throughout Wales, on behalf ofTransport for Wales.

Angela Chadwyck-Healey
Angela is Patron of the Cambridge and District Citizens Advice Bureau and President of the Arthur Rank Hospice Charity. She was a founder committee member for Cambridge 2030, which aims to make Cambridge a more equal city by 2030. Through this work and also involvement in community
resident's associations, amongst other activities, she has developed an excellent understanding of community needs. In particular, Angela recognises the need for a rapid transport system for those that live and work in the Cambridge region to provide reliable access to work, and for meeting other needs such as health care, education and leisure. She has supported Cambridge Connect since its inception because light rail is the only proven mode of transport that has the capacity to provide the service required, especially for future generations.


26. Declarations of interest

Ankura, Amey, COLAS Rail, COWI, CMS and OTB Engineering
These companies are agnostic in terms of specific transport modes and are involved in a wide range of public transit delivery schemes, including both bus and rail. They are interested in helping to deliver a successful transport scheme in the Cambridgeshire region on a commercial basis. None have vested interests in any specific transport solution for Cambridgeshire, rail-based or otherwise, and have freely offered their knowledge and expertise in order to help deliver an evidence-led solution with the best chance of success.
Collaboration has been on an informal basis to date.

Cambridge Connect
Cambridge Connect was founded on the principle of helping to design, develop and deliver the best public transport scheme for Cambridgeshire based on evidence, and is agnostic in terms of specific transport modes provided they meet quality and deliverability criteria.
Evidence reviewed led to the conclusion that light rail offers the most promising technology for delivery of a successful mass transit backbone in Cambridgeshire, and this would need to integrate with all other modes. Conceptual design work has therefore focussed on light rail as the core of the mass transit scheme. Work has been undertaken on both a cost-recovery and/ or voluntary basis, and in future Cambridge Connect aims to continue this work on a commercial basis.
Railfuture and UK Tram
These non-commercial groups aim to promote and support the public interest in rail-based transit in the United Kingdom in general. They have no commercial interests in the outcome for Cambridgeshire. These groups formed natural partners in the project because they possess substantial expertise in the field.

Cambourne - Cambridge Bus Road (C2C)
Independent Audit

Submission prepared by Colin M. Harris
25 ApriI 2021 (v1)
cambndge connec1

1 Introduction 3
2 Summary conclusions 3
3 Long-term transport planning 5
4 Implications of the pandemic 5
5 Sustainability 5
6 Alternative to the alignment proposed by GCP 6
7 Park & Ride proposal by GCP 8
Supporting maps and figures 8




1 Introduction
Cambridge Connect was initiated to promote a strategic and sustainable approach to public transport in Cambridgeshire. Emphasis is placed on an integrated and multi-modal approach to meeting the transport needs for Cambridge and the surrounding region. We recognise the need to link local solutions into broader regional strategies. Cambridge Connect has coordinated with a range of individuals, companies and organisations in developing its proposals. In particular, Railfuture and UK Tram have played a prominent role in the overall development of a light rail network for the region.
This submission made to the Cambourne - Cambridge Bus Road (C2C) Independent Audit focuses on an alternative to the preferred scheme proposal by the Greater Cambridge Partnership.
The alternative proposal is co-aligned with the A428 over a critical part of the route, and would avoid severance of, and landtake within, the Green Belt in this area (Figure 1).
2 Summary conclusions
In summary, Cambridge Connect:
Supports development of a new public transport route to the west of Cambridge following a fully segregated alignment immediately adjacent to, and co-aligned with, the A428 highway in the section between Madingley Mulch Roundabout and the Girton Interchange.
2 Does not accept the assumption by the GCP that an alternative fully segregated public transport route aligned to avoid severance of, and impacts on, the Green Belt is not possible, in particular because this conclusion is not supported by thorough and adequate evidence.
3 Does not support the route preferred by the GCP because of unacceptably high and unnecessary impacts on the Green Belt and on the highly valued rural landscape which lies in close proximity to Coton and Cambridge in general, which have not been sufficiently taken into account.
4 Does not support the current proposals of the GCP for the large Park & Ride at Scotland Farm, the size of which is likely to encourage and support travel by private cars to that point. Rather investment should instead consider any additional P&R, if deemed necessary, with emerging plans for both East-West Rail (EWR) and the CAM 'metro' public transport network.
5 The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that current approaches to public transport delivery do not have sufficient resilience to operate effectively in the face of such shocks. The current bus road proposals are based on old approaches from the last century, and do not have sufficient resilience to cope with similar potential scenarios in the future. At a minimum, the C2C scheme should be paused to allow detailed consideration to changes that are necessary to build in greater resilience to our public transport systems, especially those for access to critical services such as healthcare and research centres.
6 Supports the submission made by the Coton Parish Council, which includes the independent technical report prepared by specialist transport consultancy i-Transport which forms an integral part of the submission by Coton Parish Council.
7 A series of maps and figures illustrating the A428 co-aligned alternative to the C2C preferred alignment is provided with this submission.

3 Long-term transport planning
Cambridge Connect considers that infrastructure development needs to be fit-for-purpose for the region with a planning horizon into the 2030s and beyond. The key drivers of economy, population, demand, education, science & technology environment & heritage, and social & cultural values all need to be taken into account with a long-term view, and these need to be balanced against the cost and investment needed for future generations.
It is important that communities are tightly integrated into future public transport provision, and this is vital to ensure the best possible up-take of the services, and to provide excellent connections for residents.
Before progressing new busways or bus roads, a detailed plan for delivery of the long-term strategy for Cambridgeshire public transport needs to be set out and adopted. Local solutions should then be designed so they integrate seamlessly into the overall strategic plan, both in terms of technologies used for the 'metro' and also the routes. This strategy should be at an advanced stage of development when implementing local solutions, even if this would mean a short-term delay in delivery of some local improvements. This approach would avoid waste and bring cost-savings over the medium-term.
4 Implications of the pandemic
The implications of the current COVID-19 pandemic for public transport are major and cannot be ignored. The pandemic has demonstrated that we need to design our public transport systems to be more resilient to shocks. The science tells us that COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we face. It is clear that current approaches and systems have been inadequately designed and prepared for such challenges.
The authorities should carefully consider the implications for bus-based solutions which are inherently based on existing models, which have been shown to lack the capacity and technologies to enable more resilience in public transport. While light rail is by no means a panacea, it does have the substantial advantage of much greater capacity than buses, and in this it has the potential to be much more flexible and resilient to future shocks.
Before rushing to deliver a bus road solution - with major damage to the local landscape - the authorities should carefully consider how improved resilience can be built into our public transport systems. This is particularly the case in C2C which should play a vital role in servicing communities and education facilities, as well as the City Centre, to which key workers need continued access during pandemics.
5 Sustainability
Around one third of energy consumption is used on transport (MacKay, 2009: Sustainability without the hot air: p.118). The evidence shows that rail remains the most energy-efficient means of public transport available, being at least twice as efficient as buses and up to 18 times more efficient than cars. Improving the energy efficiency of our transport systems must be a key consideration in our choice of transport solutions. This approach is consistent with commitments made at the 2015 Paris Summit on Climate Change, and with the more recent declarations by the UK Government of the 'Climate Emergency' and in specific carbon reduction targets, in particular with respect to the need to adopt more sustainable approaches to city planning and transport. Light rail has been demonstrated to drive higher levels of modal shift than buses. These important conclusions have been emphasised at recent Climate summits.
Light rail also performs much better than other public transport on pollutant emissions. Fine particulate pollution is released by rubber-tyred vehicles, and these pollutants enter the atmosphere, terrestrial and water systems. These emissions have been shown to account for as much particulate pollution as released by vehicle tail-pipes, so even if the proposed buses were electric a substantial air pollution problem remains. Rubber tyres are largely made from synthetic plastics, which take a very

long time to degrade. The microplastics from wear enter into aquatic and terrestrial systems, and are taken up by organisms. In addition, large numbers of waste tyres are produced, and for a high frequency metro operation this could lead to many hundreds or thousands of waste tyres per year. The C2C proposals do not address these aspects of sustainability adequately.
Light rail is more sustainable for metro operation than buses because it consumes substantially less power than rubber-tyred buses, owing to the low rolling resistance of steel wheels on rails (~ one tenth of rubber tyres on road). Light rail lines may also offer benefits through more sustainable water drainage systems than the extensive tarmac/ concrete needed for bus roads.
These considerations, in particular with respect to the selection of mode for transport delivery (ie bus or light rail) need to be reviewed and taken into more consideration in the development of the C2C scheme.
6 Alternative to the alignment proposed by GCP
6.1.1 Cambridge Connect strongly opposes the alignment proposed by the Greater Cambridge Partnership for C2C.
6.1.2 The Girton interchange is one of the most important strategic junctions in the region, being as it is at the crossroads of nationally and regionally important highways of the M11, A14, A428 and A1307 (Huntingdon Road). However, the GCP has specifically excluded this from detailed consideration for reasons which do not hold up to scrutiny. The assessments that have been made to date have been based on poor and superficial evidence.
6.1.3 Maps 1-5 and two figures presented below outline how the alternative alignment along the A428 highway (suggested by Cambridge Connect) could be configured.
6.1.4 From Madingley Mulch Roundabout the alignment could proceed on either side of the A428 to the Girton Interchange, although maps presented here illustrate only the option for the alignment on the south/ southeast side of the A428. An alignment on the north side would also seem feasible, although would need investigation of options for crossing to the south (and hence to the West Campus) at some point either at or before the Girton Interchange.
6.1.5 The alignment presented to the south/ southeast of the A428 highway would proceed immediately alongside the A428 highway (co-aligned to the side of the highway with appropriate barrier separation), follow under existing bridges over the A428, then from the Girton Interchange proceed under the M11 using an underpass (in the area where the Ml 1 is already elevated and an underpass currently exists), thence south via the general vicinity Eddington and the Madingley Park & Ride to the West Campus. This proposal is necessarily indicative at this stage, although it has been confirmed that the proposal is viable at a high level of consideration and as such warrants detailed investigation as a realistic alternative before the C2C scheme alignment should be further progressed.
6.1.6 Inadequate evaluation has been made of this alternative, and others, which seems to have occurred because the C2C scheme has been based on a number of false assumptions. Most important amongst those has been the assumption that the Girton Interchange option should not be considered as a potential route because it would take too long to deliver and is more complex and costly. This assumption fails to consider that the route could be delivered via the Girton Interchange area without necessarily altering the Girton Interchange itself.
6.1.7 Alterations to the Girton Interchange involve changes to the road network, while the alignment presented in this alternative is separate and fully segregated from the road network and is not dependent on alterations to the Girton Interchange itself.
6.1.8 Even without alterations to the interchange itself, the alternative offers substantial benefits by co-alignment with major existing transport routes and also by avoiding sensitive Green Belt and heritage resources, while still serving the communities and scheme objectives. The alternative therefore represents a realistic alignment that could be brought forward irrespective of whether or not Highways England make alterations to the interchange itself.

6.1.9 Thus, a connection into, and integration with, the Girton Interchange is a not a necessary part of such an alignment. However, if adopted, that option would be available when and if this is considered desirable and affordable in the future. An alignment via the general location of the Girton Interchange, without alterations to it, enables it to be future-proofed for future developments by ensuring that the C2C route proceeds via the immediate vicinity of what is arguably the most important strategic junction in the region.
6.1.10 The assumption has also been made that the route via the Girton Interchange would represent a diversion that would compromise the attractiveness of the public transport route between Cambourne and Cambridge because of the extra distance. However, we have shown that the alternative route would add only approximately 1 ½ minutes to journey times on a segregated route compared to the preferred C2C route. When considered against the range of major benefits of the alternative alignment, this small journey time penalty is acceptable.
6.1.11 The alternative route would directly support the community of Eddington. Moreover, the route would open up opportunities for onward connections to communities such as Bar Hill and Northstowe in the future.
6.1.12 The C2C route makes an unnecessary incursion into Green Belt and development of major infrastructure for a busy transport route across relatively tranquil and unspoiled rural landscapes of high aesthetic value. It will impact local ecology and recreational uses, as well as commercial farms. It will create additional severance of the Madingley Hill and Bin Brook valley from local communities. These values have not been given sufficient consideration in the decision to pursue this route. The GCP preferred C2C route requires major new land-take from the Green Belt. There is insufficient justification for this because a feasible route via the A428 / Ml 1 exists utilising existing transport corridors.
6.1.13 The GCP route runs counter to policies that seek to minimise the impact of infrastructure and development on Green Belt land, and against policies that seek to protect landscapes of high value. The landscape affected is immediately adjacent to one of the very few elevated sites in the Cambridge region, namely Madingley Hill. This site is already compromised by the A1303 highway, and a further major public transport route across this landscape will further degrade and despoil the remaining high landscape values.
6.1.14 The focus of this submission has been on the section of alternative between Madingley Mulch Roundabout and the West Campus because this section represents a major strategic failing in the C2C scheme. There are also significant failings in Hardwick and the City Centre.
6.1.15 Cambridge Connect has wider proposals for an integrated scheme across the Cambridge region using light rail, including for a short tunnel (2.6 km) extending from near the West Campus through the city centre to the Cambridge Rail Station. Details of these proposals can be accessed on the Cambridge Connect website (www.cambridge-connect.uk).These wider proposals address deficiencies in the C2C scheme within the Cambridge city centre, where a coherent plan for practical public transport that is transformative of journeys is largely missing from the GCP C2C scheme. The existing plans for how C2C would work within the City Centre are inadequate and fail to show how the scheme would be delivered in an integrated and coherent manner without significant impacts on city residents and businesses.
6.2 Opportunities for long-term gains – developing an integrated approach to improvements in rail and public transport in Cambridge
6.2.1 Future developments of the heavy rail network need to be taken into consideration. For example, developments such as Cambridge South Station, East-West Rail (EWR), and service improvements more generally will influence activity and services on the main rail lines.
6.2.2 C2C should not be progressed without detailed planning for integration with CAM.
6.2.3 C2C should not be progressed without detailed planning for integration with EWR.

7 Park & Ride proposal by GCP
7.1.1 Cambridge Connect opposes the proposed Park & Ride at Scotland Farm, and considers it in the wrong location. Cambridge Connect supports some form of new Park & Ride in the general vicinity of Cambourne.
7.1.2 However, as a general principle, it is important that the location selected and size is appropriate and can be practically integrated with future development of the CAM and EWR.

FOLLOWING BELOW: SUPPORTING MAPS AND FIGURES

DISTANCE & JOURNEY TIMES
GCP 'C2C' vs 'A428 Co-Aligned Northern Route' COMPARISON Potential P&R A14
(Connect to stop via footbridge) Scale: 1:10 000 @ A3 Basemap: Sentinel Imagery
25 June 2020.
Prepared by: Cambridge Connect © 2021 www.cambridge-connect.uk 10 Apr 2021 Version 10.1

Girton
!!! GIRTON INTERCHANGE

Existing farm road
Northern route: MMR to 'BABBAGE' underpass of M11
via Girton Interchange Distance = 5.06 km Journey time = 5.06 mins
Madingley @ 60 kph average speed
= 1.42 km / 1.42 mins longer

Northwest Cambridge
Northern route: in A428 cutting !!! EDDINGTON
Co-aligned with A428

800-Yr Wood Eddington
To Scotland Farm M11
Park & Ride ~2 km

Madingley Wood American
SSSI Cemetary
Madingley Mulch
Roundabout (MMR) GCP C2C Route:
A1303 MMR to 'BABBAGE' via Coton
Distance = 3.64 km
Journey time = 3.64 mins @ 60 kph average speed
GCP C2C route: across Green Belt = 1.42 km / 1.42 mins shorter
High
Cross West
Map 1 - LEGEND Campus
A428 Co-Aligned Route (indicative) Coton !!! BABBAGE
100-y old orchards

C2C Bus Route (indicative)
0 0.5 1
Miles
0 1 2
Kilometres


C2C INDICATIVE ALTERNATIVE ALIGNMENT
Northern Route to Girton Interchange Co-Aligned with A428 Alignment at Madingley Mulch Roundabout
To Scotland Farm Park & Ride ~2 km
New bridge over A428 for public transport

A428
in cutting

To Madingley 1km

To Girton Interchange 2.5km

Bridge starts here (approx)


Alignment passes under Bridge

Madingley Mulch Roundabout (MMR)






Proposed Alternative Alignment (width 8 m)

ad
To Hardwick 2km

To Cambridge 5.6km
Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AeroGRID, IGN, and the GIS User Community

C2C INDICATIVE ALTERNATIVE ALIGNMENT
Northern Route to Girton Interchange Co-Aligned with A428 A428 cutting at Madingley A428 Co-Alignment Positives
+ Follows existing major transport alignment
+ In A428 cutting to reduce noise
+ Car traffic reduced = noise reduced on A428
+ Protects important landscapes
+ Avoids American Cemetary
+ Avoids Madingley Wood SSSI
+ Avoids Eight Hundred Wood
+ Avoids Green Belt fragmentation Scale: 1:1000 @ A3 Basemap: ArcGIS Imagery
Prepared by: Cambridge Connect © 2021 www.cambridge-connect.uk 01 Mar 2021 Version 10.0

Madingley

Potential Madingley stop if alignment on
N side of A428 (optional) Indicative upper
level of cutting slope (~8 m (25 ft) vertically above A428)
Potential Madingley stop (optional)



Bridge buttress here (approx)

Co-aligned with A428
Width = 8 m Alignment passes
under Bridge


Trinity
Alignment in cutting Cottages
with retaining wall
No landtake from Eight Hundred Wood

Map 3 - LEGEND Eight Hundred Wood
Proposed Alternative Alignment (width 8 m)
0 50 100
Metres Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AeroGRID, IGN, and the GIS User Community


C2C INDICATIVE ALTERNATIVE ALIGNMENT
Northern Route to Girton Interchange Co-Aligned with A428 Option - Co-Aligned Southeast side of A428

To Dry Drayton 3km Bar Hill 4 km

A428 Co-Alignment Positives
+ Strategic location future-proofed for onward links
+ Follows existing major transport alignments
+ Avoids fragmentation of Green Belt
+ Minimises environmental impacts - reduces road traffic
+ Avoids American Cemetary (Grade I Listed)
+ Supports Eddington / West Campus
++ Fully segregated, practical & deliverable

Scale: 1:5000 @ A3 Basemap: ArcGIS Imagery
Prepared by: Cambridge Connect © 2021 www.cambridge-connect.uk 01 Mar 2021 Version 10.0

Girton

Potential P&R & Coach Station


To Science Park 4km


Pedestrian overbridge from P&R / Coach Stn to Metro stop



Potential Offramp from A428 eastbound to P&R / Coach Station via underpass of A14 westbound causeway

GIRTON INTERCHANGE


Proposed Alternative Alignment (width 8 m)

C2C Northern route via Girton Interchange (1 min 45 sec longer)

Expand existing
M11 Underpass Parallels M11

To Eddington 0.75km West Campus 2km Cambridge 4km




Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AeroGRID, IGN, and the GIS User Community

C2C INDICATIVE ALTERNATIVE ALIGNMENT
Route Co-Aligned with A428 via Eddington West Campus layout - key constraints Scale: 1:5000 @ A3 Basemap: ArcGIS Imagery
Prepared by: Cambridge Connect © 2021 www.cambridge-connect.uk
01 Mar 2021 Version 10.0
Eddington

Madingley Park & Ride



A1303 J13 Public Transport
Route Junction Public Transport Option B Route Junction
Option A

C

M11


Ancient orchards


West Campus
Public Transport Route GCP Option w M11 bridge










Map 5 - LEGEND
Proposed Alternative Alignment (width 8 m)
To City
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
Metres Source: Esri, Maxar, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AeroGRID, IGN, and the GIS User Community


Indicative schematic of cutting on A428 at Madingley - view west. Typical cross section. Dimensions in metres (approx).


PRESENT SITUATION
Trinity Cottages


~60 m to bridge


Ground level


Bridge rail level


Bridge ~60 m




Bridge base clearance level



Buttress



Embankment

1.0


6.0


15.0


8.0



6.25

A428
2 lanes 2 lanes
A428 Road level






WITH PUBLIC TRANSPORT LANES CO-ALIGNED WITH A428
Trinity Cottages


~60 m to bridge









Ground level


Bridge rail level



Bridge ~60 m


Buttress



Retaining Wall

2 lanes 6.25



Embankment





1.0







6.0

3.25







15.0





3.65



Two lanes
7.3 3.65
8.0



A428 Road level



APPROX SCALE

0 15 30 45 60


METRES

Schematic of bridges on A428 - south side, view west. Typical cross section. Dimensions in metres (approx).

Bridge rail level
1.0

6.0


15.0

8.0



Madingley dimensions - 15.0 m from pier to buttress edge, 6.25 m height from A428 road level to clearance under bridge. Church Road dimensions - 16.0 m from pier to buttress edge, 8.0 m height from A428 road level to clearance under bridge.
A428 MMR Offramp dimensions - 15.0 m from pier to buttress edge, 5.0 m height from A428 road level to clearance under bridge.

LETTER OF COMMUNITY CONSENSUS
FROM CAMBRIDGE PARISH COUNCILS, DISTRICT COUNCILLORS AND COMMUNITY GROUPS

01 May 2019

The Rt. Hon. Chris Grayling MP Secretary of State for Transport

cc: The Rt. Hon. James Brokenshire MP, Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government

Heidi Allen MP for South Cambridgeshire Daniel Zeichner MP for Cambridge
Lucy Fraser MP for East Cambridgeshire
James Palmer, Mayor, Cambridgeshire & Peterborough Combined Authority Councillor Bridget Smith, Leader of South Cambridgeshire District Council Councillor Lewis Herbert, Leader of Cambridge City Council
Rachel Stopard, CEO Greater Cambridge Partnership Jim O’Sullivan, CEO Highways England


Dear Secretary of State,

Open Letter of Community Consensus on the need for all-ways connectivity at the Girton Interchange serving the M11, A428, A14 and A1307 at Cambridge.
The Girton Interchange is a key strategic junction on the Cambridge regional road network, connecting the M11, A14, A428 and A1307. The junction is severely hampered by a lack of all-ways connectivity. Enabling full connectivity will provide faster and more efficient connections on the road network, help to alleviate some of the long-standing congestion problems in the region and facilitate regional transport links to support economic growth. Moreover, it will improve connections between new housing developments west of Cambridge, the M11 motorway and the rapidly growing biotechnology cluster south of Cambridge city. Longer-term, the junction is vital to proposed improvements to east- west links.
Purpose of this letter
We are a group of Parish Councils and South Cambridgeshire District Councillors, representing over 30,000 people living in communities in and near Cambridge, and selected community interest groups. We note the letter from the Greater Cambridge Partnership (GCP) to Highways England (19 Oct 2017) regarding the urgent need for all-ways connectivity at the Girton Interchange; we welcome the consensus among local governments, the Combined Authority for Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, the GCP, MPs and business groups to progress this scheme; and we warmly welcome the positive indications from Highways England for delivery in due course.
We are concerned, however, that Highways England has not yet committed to include the Girton Interchange in the Road Investment Strategy (RIS-2) work period between 2020 and 2030, and that no clear plan has yet been articulated.


We write to express, in the strongest terms possible, our support for this development, which is long overdue, and to request that it be given urgent priority.


Requests for urgent action

1. We request that work on improvements to the Girton Interchange to enable all-ways connectivity be accelerated and given urgent priority as part of the strategic transport improvements needed in this region.
2. We request that the strategic importance of the Girton Interchange be fully recognised by ensuring it is integrated with any mass transit scheme taken forward to the west of Cambridge.
3. We request that improvements help to reduce, and not exacerbate, the already detrimental impacts of traffic on the local road network and on the immediately surrounding communities.
4. We request that present proposals to constrict the capacity of the A428 eastbound where it joins the A14 at the Girton Interchange, from the present two lanes down to one lane, be reconsidered in anticipation of future needs.
5. We request that, where practicable, this work be integrated with on-going work on the A14 to make the most cost-effective use of resources and supporting works already mobilised.
6. We request that funding be made available and that all stakeholders work together to give their full commitment, with the aim of delivering these improvements by 2023 at the latest.

The letter from the GCP and MPs and the response from Highways England are encouraging, and we are pleased that support is broad and analysis is underway. However, we note that these improvements have been called for by the community for more than twenty years, with little action to date. Much as we welcome the ongoing work of Highways England, there is currently no commitment to a timetable for completion of the improvements at the Girton Interchange. We believe the time for clear, unambiguous action has arrived, and a plan and timetable for delivery of this essential infrastructure is urgently needed.
In summary, all-ways interconnections at this critical junction are in the local, regional and wider national strategic interest and are in need of urgent action by all relevant parties.

If it would be helpful, we would be pleased to meet you or your officials to provide more information on the views of the community on the scheme.

We look forward to hearing from you.




Coalition of Parish Councils


Steve Jones Chair Cambridge Connect





Dr Colin Harris Director


Parish Councils, District Councillors and Community groups expressing support for this letter
The Coalition of Parish Councils comprising Arrington, Barton, Bourn, Boxworth, Caldecote, Caxton, Comberton, Connington, Coton, Croxton, Dry Drayton, Elsworth, Eltisley, Eversden, Grantchester, Hardwick, Knapwell, Longstowe, Madingley, and Toft parish councils.

Girton Parish Council and South Trumpington Parish Council, which are not members of the Coalition, also have endorsed the letter. Cambourne Town Council has also long-expressed support for all-ways connectivity at the Girton Interchange.

South Cambridgeshire District Councillors:

• Cllr Ian Sollom (Harston & Comberton) (the Parishes of Barton, Comberton, Coton, Grantchester, Harlton, Harston, Haslingfield, Hauxton and South Trumpington)
• Cllr Philip Allen (Harston & Comberton)
• Cllr Tony Mason (Harston & Comberton)
• Cllr Grenville Chamberlain (Hardwick) (the Parishes of Hardwick and Toft)
• Cllr Tumi Hawkins (Caldecote) (the Parishes of Bourn, Caldecote, Childerley, Kingston, Little Gransden and Longstowe)
• Cllr Tom Bygott (Girton) (the Parishes of Dry Drayton, Girton and Madingley)
• Cllr Dr Shrobona Bhattacharya – Cambourne
• Cllr Ruth Betson – Cambourne

Selected Community interest groups:

• Cambridge Ahead
• Cambridge Connect
• Cambridge Past, Present & Future
• Federation of Cambridge Residents Associations (FeCRA)
• Smarter Cambridge Transport

Background
On 19 October 2017 an open letter was written from the Greater Cambridge Partnership to Jim
O’Sullivan, Chief Executive of Highways England regarding the Roads Investment Strategy 2 (RIS2) – M11 in Cambridgeshire. This letter noted a clear consensus within our region for the improvements to the Girton Interchange, as indicated by the broad representation in the letter of local government, the academic and business communities, and Members of Parliament for Cambridge City and South Cambridgeshire.
Martin Fellows, Regional Director of Operations (East) Highways England, responded on 17 Nov 2017 that the agency is assessing the strategic road network (SRN), including pressures on the M11 and the case for improvements at Girton Interchange, which will feed into RIS2. Following consultation, the Investment Plan for RIS2 will continue to be developed over 2018. In due course the Secretary of State for Transport will decide on priorities for RIS2, to be published in 2019.
The Girton Interchange is a key strategic junction on the regional road network, which is severely hampered by a lack of all-ways connectivity. Enabling connectivity will provide faster and more efficient connections on the road network, help to alleviate some of the long-standing congestion problems in


the region, facilitate regional transport links and support economic growth. Moreover, it will improve connections between areas west of Cambridge, such as Cambourne, and the M11 motorway, and support the increasing population. Longer-term, the junction is vital to proposed improvements in East- West links between Cambridge, Milton Keynes and Oxford, as recommended by the National Infrastructure Commission.
We recognise that some villages lying in close proximity to the Girton Interchange are already significantly affected by noise and air pollution from the current road system. It is important therefore that improvements should help to reduce, and do not exacerbate, any impacts on local communities.


Coalition of Parish Councils
The Coalition of Parish Councils to the West of Cambridge was formed to provide a coordinated voice on planning issues.


Cambridge Connect
Cambridge Connect was formed in 2016 to promote enduring and sustainable transport for Cambridge, in particular a light rail metro with an underground in the historic city core. The Girton Interchange is considered a key node on the network, where the metro would link with important strategic highways. Cambridge Connect works closely with Railfuture, UK Tram and Rail Haverhill, amongst others.

More information on Cambridge Connect is available at www.cambridge-connect.uk


Address for Correspondence
Dr Colin Harris Director
Cambridge Connect 12 Silverdale Avenue
Coton, Cambridge CB23 7PP

Email: colin.harris@cambridge-connect.uk Tel: 01954 212 847

Cambridge Southeast Transport (CSET) Greater Cambridge Partnership
Public Consultation

Prepared by Colin M. Harris 14 December 2020 (v1)









1 Introduction 3
2 Summary conclusions 4
3 Long-term transport planning 7
4 Implications of the pandemic 7
5 Sustainability 7
6 Light rail: general benefits for Cambridge Southeast 8
7 Specific comments on route proposed by GCP 9
8 Park & Ride proposals by GCP 15
9 References 15


1 Introduction
Cambridge Connect was initiated to promote a strategic and sustainable approach to public transport in Cambridgeshire. Emphasis is placed on an integrated and multi-modal approach to meeting the transport needs for Cambridge and the surrounding region. We recognise the need to link local solutions into broader regional strategies.
Within the immediate Cambridge region, we have proposed a light rail line from the Girton Interchange in the northwest to Granta Park in the southeast, via the University West Campus, city centre, Cambridge Central Rail Station, Addenbrookes, Great Shelford, Stapleford and Sawston. The line would extend ~22 km (~14 mi) and we call this route the 'Isaac Newton Line' (Figure 1) (Harris et al. 2019). The light rail line would follow existing and former rail alignments, run underground within the historic city core, and follow the busway alignment between Cambridge Central Rail Station and Addenbrookes. Extensions to the 'Isaac Newton Line' light rail backbone are possible in due course, for example to Haverhill and Cambourne.
This approach would provide a transformational long-term solution for Cambridge that is both scalable in terms of capacity and extendible to key destinations as demand and finances allow. Cambridge Connect is coordinating with Railfuture and UK Tram in developing these proposals and engaging with local organisations (e.g. CPPF, local parishes and Rail Haverhill) and residents.
Cambridge Connect understands that the Greater Cambridge Partnership has presently excluded light rail from consideration. However, we believe this decision should be reconsidered and light rail should form part of the strategic long-term approach to meeting transport needs in Cambridgeshire.
Reconsideration of light rail is needed because it is clear from Steer (2019) that the costs for the Cambridgeshire Autonomous Metro (CAM) will be comparable to Cambridge Light Rail. The original conclusion that CAM could be delivered for one-third of the cost of light rail has been shown to be wrong (Steer 2019). The business case for CAM was 'compelling' and would be stronger with light rail, which is able to deliver greater modal shift than buses. It is therefore essential that the strategy for metro delivery in Cambridgeshire is thoroughly reviewed to include light rail.
Notwithstanding the above views regarding light rail, we recognise the Greater Cambridge Partnership (GCP) has presently committed itself to bus-based solutions. In the context of this response to the public consultation therefore, our focus is on the selection of route rather than the mode of vehicle that would travel on that route. We have therefore made our evaluation of proposals for a fully segregated bus road following the Shelford Rail Alignment (Figure 2), not light rail.
Our evaluation is informed in part by detailed evidence developed by an independent evaluation of the option of a public transport route from Granta Park to Addenbrookes that broadly follows the Shelford Rail Alignment (Figure 2). This evaluation was commissioned by the Parish Councils of Great Shelford and Stapleford in 2020 and undertaken by the professional transport specialist consultants i­ Transport, London. Specifically, this professional review critically examined evidence underpinning the report to the GCP prepared by Mott MacDonald published in May 2020.


2 Summary conclusions
In summary, Cambridge Connect:
Supports development of a new public transport route in the Southeast following the alignment of the existing and former rail lines via Great Shelford / Stapleford. A fully segregated public transport route along the entire Shelford Railway Alignment, including through the villages adjacent to the existing rail line, has been shown to be feasible by independent specialist transport consultants.
2 Does not accept the conclusion by the GCP (as advised by Mott MacDonald in May 2020) that a new public transport route (whether light rail or busway) aligned with the existing and former rail line through Great Shelford/ Stapleford is not feasible because the conclusion is not supported by thorough and adequate evidence.
3 Does not support the route proposed by the GCP because of unacceptably high and unnecessary impacts on the Green Belt and on the highly valued rural landscape which lies in close proximity to Gog Magog Hills and Magog Down, which have not been sufficiently taken into account.
4 Does not support the current proposals of the GCP for the large Park & Ride on the A11, the size of which is likely to encourage and support travel by private vehicles. The old approach of large Park & Rides is out-moded, and the focus and investment should instead be made in delivering a first class public transport network with a more distributed model of access nodes.
5 Supports some form of Park & Ride at Granta Park, although of more modest scale and the location should support delivery of a new public transport route to Haverhill, which will strongly influence demand for Park & Ride at this location. The location selected does not appear best suited to supporting a practical segregated public transport route to Haverhill. Delivery of the link to Haverhill should be accelerated, and should be planned in an integrated way with any Park & Ride proposals. We propose the route to Haverhill should follow the broad alignment of the former railway and be implemented using light rail.
6 The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that current approaches to public transport delivery do not have sufficient resilience to operate effectively in the face of such shocks. The current bus road proposals are based on old approaches from the last century, and do not have sufficient resilience to cope with similar potential scenarios in the future. At a minimum, the CSET scheme should be paused to allow detailed consideration to changes that are necessary to build in greater resilience to our public transport systems, especially those for access to critical services such as healthcare and research centres. For example, light rail has the potential to offer greater resilience through its superior passenger capacity, potentially allowing services to operate with higher social distancing in place and better margins of safety. While we do not see light rail as a panacea, it is concerning that the GCP seems to be pressing ahead as though nothing has changed.
7 Supports submissions made by Cambridge Past Present & Future, the Parishes of Great Shelford and Stapleford, Magog Down Trust, Railfuture, and Smarter Cambridge Transport related to CSET.


3 Long-term transport planning
Cambridge Connect considers that infrastructure development needs to be fit-for-purpose for the region with a planning horizon into the 2030s and beyond. The key drivers of economy, population, demand, education, science & technology environment & heritage, and social & cultural values all need to be taken into account with a long-term view, and these need to be balanced against the cost and investment needed for future generations.
It is important that communities are tightly integrated into future public transport provision, and this is vital to ensure the best possible up-take of the services, and to provide excellent connections for residents. Where practicable, and when balanced against the environmental impacts of other options, public transport should seek to achieve well-connected communities.
Before progressing new busways, a detailed plan for delivery of the long-term strategy for Cambridgeshire public transport needs to be adopted. Local solutions should then be designed so they integrate seamlessly into the overall strategic plan, both in terms of technologies used for the metro and also the routes. This strategy should be at an advanced stage of development when implementing local solutions, even if this would mean a short-term delay in delivery of some local improvements. This approach would avoid waste and bring cost-savings over the medium-term.
4 Implications of the pandemic
The implications of the current COVID-19 pandemic for public transport are major and cannot be ignored. The pandemic has demonstrated that we need to design our public transport systems to be more resilient to shocks. The science tells us that COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we face. It is clear that current approaches and systems have been inadequately designed and prepared for such challenges.
The GCP should carefully consider the implications for bus-based solutions which are inherently based on existing models, which have been shown to lack the capacity and technologies to enable more resilience in public transport. While light rail is by no means a panacea, it does have the substantial advantage of much greater capacity than buses, and in this it has the potential to be much more flexible and resilient to future shocks.
Before rushing to deliver a bus road solution - with major damage to the local landscape - the GCP should carefully consider how improved resilience can be built into our public transport systems. This is particularly the case in CSET which will play a vital role in servicing essential healthcare facilities, to which key workers need continued access and especially in pandemics.
5 Sustainability
Around one third of energy consumption is used on transport (MacKay, 2009: 118). The evidence shows that rail remains the most energy-efficient means of public transport available, being at least twice as efficient as buses and up to 18 times more efficient than cars. Improving the energy efficiency of our transport systems must be a key consideration in our choice of transport solutions. This approach is consistent with commitments made at the 2015 Paris Summit on Climate Change, and with the more recent declaration by the UK Government of the 'Climate Emergency', in particular with respect to the need to adopt more sustainable approaches to city planning and transport. These important conclusions have been underscored at recent Climate summits.
Light rail also performs much better than other public transport on pollutant emissions. Fine particulate pollution is released by rubber-tyred vehicles, and these pollutants enter the atmosphere, terrestrial and water systems. These emissions have been shown to account for as much particulate


pollution as released by vehicle tail-pipes, so even if buses were electric a substantial air pollution problem would remain. Rubber tyres are largely made from synthetic plastics, which take a very long time to degrade. The microplastics from wear enter into aquatic and terrestrial systems, and are taken up by organisms. In addition, large numbers of waste tyres are produced, and for a high frequency metro operation this could lead to many hundreds or thousands of waste tyres per year.
Light rail is more sustainable for metro operation than buses because it consumes substantially less power than rubber-tyred buses, owing to the low rolling resistance of steel wheels on rails (~ one tenth of rubber tyres on road). Light rail lines may also offer benefits through more sustainable water drainage systems than the extensive tarmac/ concrete needed for bus roads.
6 Light rail: general benefits for Cambridge Southeast
The 'Isaac Newton Line' would substantially address transport needs to the south of Cambridge in the general area of the A1307 highway by linking the bioscience campuses at Granta Park/ Babraham to the biomedical campus at Addenbrookes and to the central rail station and city centre. In the southeast Cambridge region, the 'Isaac Newton Line' would:
• Provide a light rail 'backbone' extending from Granta Park in the southeast to Girton Interchange in the northwest, linked to the heart of Cambridge city;
• Integrate with the heavy rail network at Cambridge Central Rail Station, at Great Shelford, and at the proposed new Cambridge South Station at Addenbrookes;
• Provide multimodal links to bus/ coach and Park & Ride services at key interchanges - for example the A11 / AS0S. Similar multimodal links would be provided at Junction 11 on the Ml 1 / A10 and atthe Girton Interchange on the A428 / A14 / M11;
• Provide a new Park & Ride near the A11 / AS0S junction, close to the A1307 and Granta Park which would serve the surrounding region (although smaller than proposed by GCP);
• Provide reliable, fast and frequent public transport into the heart of Cambridge from the south, meeting public transport objectives in this region;
• Provide a reliable, fast and frequent link between the three University campuses;
• Connect the Babraham Campus and Granta Park employment centres and other research institutes and businesses in the south of Cambridge directly with the Biomedical Campus, the city centre, and University West Campus;
• Provide an excellent public transport service that could be linked to Hinxton / Wellcome Trust and Babraham Campus developments by short and cost-effective shuttle services, which could in the future be fully automated;
• Relieve vehicle traffic pressure on the A1307 / Hills Road by attracting people onto the alternative light rail route, which would provide rapid travel into the centre of Cambridge without congestion;
• Directly serve the villages of Sawston, Stapleford, the Shelfords, Abingdon and Babraham (the latter by shuttle) with a high-quality, reliable public transport system;
• Enable improvements in the links to Haverhill and Linton, which could be served directly by a light rail extension from Granta Park to Haverhill;
• Serve potential growth in housing and development to the south of Cambridge, including in the long-term to lower cost housing areas such as Haverhill;


• Serve and strengthen business connections at the South Cambridge Business Park;
• Serve the Football Club grounds in Sawston by excellent public transport, which would reduce potential congestion associated with game fixtures;
• Directly serve Sixth Form Colleges and the University Technical College at Long Road and Hills Road, better linking these to the villages of the Shelfords, Stapleford and Sawston;
• Encourage walking / cycling from nearby residential areas and employment centres to strategically located stops on the public transport network;
• Foster a more sustainable city and region, protecting its rich heritage and environmental values, with light rail being the best technology for air and water quality.
7 Specific comments on route proposed by GCP
Cambridge Connect strongly opposes the route proposed by the Greater Cambridge Partnership to link Addenbrookes to Granta Park on the following grounds.

7.1 Practical feasibility, constraints and costs
7.1.1 Cambridge Connect notes that WSP (2018: 2) highlighted "Stakeholders and members of the public ... indicated a preference for new infrastructure to follow, where possible, the route of the dismantled railway on the grounds this is an established and accepted transport corridor".
7.1.2 Cambridge Connect also notes WSP (2018: 2) pointed out that "Transport modelling ... identified a significant benefit from routing Strategy 1 close to the settlements of Sawston, Stapleford and Great Shelford, where the introduction of intermediate passenger stops would offer the most significant step change in user behaviour, with access to approximately 2800 dwellings within 800 metres of the route that would result in a pronounced mode shift away from private car travel, more than other options tested".
7.1.3 WSP (2018: 4) noted the "unguided nature of the design requires a more traditional carriageway width of 7.3m, based upon DMRB TD 27/95 fig4.4a), that is greater than that required for a kerb or track guided busway".
7.1.4 WSP (2018: 7-8) concluded: "A route following the dismantled railway through to Great Shelford was considered; unfortunately this is not viable for a road based Public Transport system given the lack of available space alongside the existing ... railway, particularly at Great Shelford station ... encompassed by residential and commercial development that precludes taking a new route that by-passes the station and platforms that abut the railway...". However, no factual evidence (such as measurements and identification of potentially affected structures) in support of this conclusion was presented in WSP (2018).
7.1.5 Mott MacDonald (2019) referred to the work by WSP (2018) that considered the old rail route and concluded "Given that using the former railway alignment through Shelford has previously been considered unfeasible, this was not considered further at this stage". While this seems to suggest that the WSP conclusion was taken 'as read', despite the lack of evidence, Mott MacDonald did carry out some further site technical evaluation of the specific section through Great Shelford, since part of their report identifies potential constraints along this section and includes cost estimates to address those constraints.
7.1.6 The Mott MacDonald (2019) Technical Note also concluded that a public transport route through Great Shelford parallel to the existing and former rail alignment is not feasible. However, the Technical Note did not conclude that the physical constraints could not be


overcome (listed in Section 6 of the Technical Note), but rather drew the conclusion that it would be more costly.
7.1.7 The work to overcome the practical constraints, while perhaps more difficult and expensive in certain places, nevertheless could be delivered through an additional investment to address the physical constraints.
7.1.8 Mott MacDonald (May 2020) concluded clearly that a route through the villages was technically feasible. This report demonstrates a feasible route could be implemented, provides detailed diagrams, and shows a short section of Chaston Road being adopted for "shared use". However, Mott MacDonald (2020) concluded that the route was not feasible on other grounds, but did not undertaken a proper like-for-like comparison with the route through the villages, and nor did it undertake an evaluation of the impacts on the environment by proceeding through the Green Belt landscape as proposed by GCP. The Mott MacDonald conclusions therefore cannot be relied upon because the report fails to consider important evidence that has a material bearing on the outcome.
7.1.9 The report by independent transport professionals i-Transport, commissioned by Great Shelford and Stapleford Parish Councils in 2020, demonstrated that - contrary to Mott MacDonald (2020) conclusions -a fully segregated public transport route along the entire Shelford Railway Alignment, including through the villages adjacent to the existing rail line, is feasible. Small amendments to the assumed layout design would enable this full segregation.
7.1.10 i-Transport further showed that deliverability with a revised approach following the Shelford Rail Alignment would only directly affect up to four residential properties. While we agree that property demolitions should be avoided wherever possible, they should not take over-riding precedence against other factors such as protection of the Green Belt. If this were to be the case, this would give undue weight to the interests of several properties/ residents against wider benefits for the entire community over the long term. We do not believe such an approach - as appears to be taken by the GCP - to be justified in the CSET context.
7.1.11 i-Transport have examined issues such as Passenger Demand, Cost and Environment at a high level at this stage, and while further appraisal will be required, they noted that the Mott MacDonald (2020) conclusions appear subjective and poorly evidenced, and are therefore unreliable.
7.1.12 In our view there is strong evidence that the route option through Great Shelford/ Stapleford has been dismissed prematurely by the GCP on the basis of insufficient evidence.
7.1.13 A clear distinction needs to be made between practical physical constraints (physical possibility) and budget constraints (need to consider costs versus benefits, or availability of funds). Mott MacDonald (2019, 2020) shows the practical physical constraints can be solved. Therefore, should the route through the villages be preferred, the question of feasibility becomes more a matter of cost, rather than one of pure physical constraints per se.
7.1.14 This is important, because while the cost of addressing the physical constraints of the route through Great Shelford has been estimated, the value of the Green Belt and its associated landscape, ecology, farm production (i.e. potential losses owing to 'orphaned' fields), and recreational benefits have not been assessed.
7.1.15 Neither have the additional costs of an alignment through Great Shelford been considered against the substantial additional economic benefits that would accrue by locating the public transport route at the heart of the community, as confirmed byWSP (2018) (see Section 7.1.2). These economic benefits would accrue both by fostering ridership on public transport, and also by improving the accessibility of businesses located within the villages of Great Shelford and Stapleford to people coming from outside of these communities. This would contribute to


improved economic activity and vibrancy in the villages. Additional economic benefits would accrue by reductions in the number of car journeys that would be made to access the stops.

Figure 3: Much of the former rail alignment remains as an elevated embankment suitable for reinstatement (Photo: C. Ross 2019).

7.1.16 Both the WSP (2018) and the Mott MacDonald (2019, 2020) Technical Notes are based on a non-guided road-based public transport alignment. This option would require greater land­ take than a light rail option, which has physical guidance by rails. As such, their conclusions on feasibility, both in terms of physical space and cost, do not apply to light rail. An assessment of the feasibility of light rail following the former rail line route remains needed.
7.1.17 A preliminary examination of Croydon Tramlink shows that it is possible to align a light rail line alongside a heavy rail line with minimal separation (Figure 4). While we have not carried out detailed investigations, this suggests that a light rail line along the Great Shelford route may be significantly more feasible, and perhaps less costly in some respects, than the proposed busway. For example, it is likely to have narrower width requirements, and require fewer physical barriers to separate the railway from the public transport route.
7.1.18 In addition, the GCP has made no assessment of the feasibility of small sections of single-track alignment where there are particular constraints on space at 'pinch-points'. This type of approach is currently successfully implemented at pinch-points on the southern Cambridge Guided Busway. We understand that modern signaling systems are capable of managing short single-track sections such as might be needed without significant delays. A proper assessment of this option should be undertaken, not only for light rail but also for the bus-based solution.
7.1.19 The GCP route has three at-grade crossings, each of which increase costs. The alternative light rail line as proposed below in Section 6.4 has one at-grade crossing, reducing costs. While the proposed grade separation would cost more at Granham's Road, this could be shared with other stakeholders, lowering costs to be paid for through this specific scheme.



Figure 4: Croydon Tramlink alignment immediately west of Beckenham Junction station. The light rail line is at far left, while the remaining three lines are heavy rail. (Image: Google Maps 2019).

7.2 Improved connectivity and integration
7.2.1 The route proposed by the GCP is isolated and approximately one km and uphill from centres of the villages of Great Shelford and Stapleford. It is thus not well-integrated with the community along the route. This distance is a barrier to residents and makes public transport use less likely, suppressing potential modal shift, which runs counter to the scheme purpose.
7.2.2 The distance to the new line will dissuade many from walking to the stops. This may encourage people to drive to the nearest stop, with knock-on implications for parking and congestion. While this may be mitigated to some degree by provision of a connecting bus service from the village to the new public transport line, and perhaps imposition of parking restrictions, this introduces additional and unnecessary barriers to use of public transport.
7.2.3 A public transport route going through the heart of the villages would be more accessible to the community, and as noted in WSP (2018) is also the clear preference of the local communities. This would promote use of the service, and lead to an outcome that is more environmentally, socially and economically sustainable. This approach would help to drive the much-needed modal shift, one of the scheme's overall objectives. Evidence shows that this effect is even greater where the public transport provided is light rail (Harris et al. 2019).
7.2.4 Close alignment with the heavy rail line within Great Shelford enables co-location of the Rail Station and light rail stop. This would facilitate easy interchange between light rail and heavy rail, improving public transport options for the community, and improving its attractiveness. The GCP route is isolated and fails to achieve this close connectivity.
7.2.5 Co-location of the Rail Station with a light rail stop would be an opportunity for improvements to the urban realm in this location, e.g. offering commercial opportunities for cafes etc.
7.2.6 The scheme should be planned in an integrated way with cycling, pedestrian and vehicle provisions. Public transport and cycleway/ pedestrian paths do not always need to be running

7.3 Environmental benefits, landscape values and sustainability

7.4 Opportunities for long-term gains – developing an integrated approach to improvements in rail and public transport at Cambridge Southeast
public transport route. It would also be a major benefit to the local community. It is important to consider these issues now so that schemes can be optimised to meet all objectives and are fit-for-purpose well into the future.
7.4.4 Cambridge Connect supports detailed investigation into options for grade-separated crossings of the main rail line on Granham's Road and Station Road/ Hinton Way in Great Shelford, and suggests that this should form an integral part of the overall scheme for public transport delivery because it should have a material influence on which options are selected.
7.4.5 An approach to address the grade separation problem in a way that integrates with public transport improvements in Cambridge Southeast has been outlined by Peter Wakefield, Vice­ Chair of Railfuture East Anglia. In this submission, we will refer to this proposal as the 'Grade Separation Proposal'. Cambridge Connect supports the general approach in the Grade Separation Proposal, and believes it should be given detailed consideration for delivery of any public transport solution in Cambridge Southeast. We recognise Grade Separation would be complex and that detailed studies and plans will need to be developed.
7.4.6 In summary, the outline Grade Separation Proposal proposes a new road bridge on Granham's Road to provide grade separation over the existing heavy rail line, and this would also span the parallel light rail line that we propose from Great Shelford to Addenbrookes. The Grade Separation Proposal includes closure of the current at-grade crossing on Station Road/ Hinton Way, with provision of an alternative vehicle route over to the newly-bridged Grantham Road. Pedestrian/ cycle access along Station Road/ Hinton Way would be continued via a modern, wide ramped, fully accessible and well-lit subway under the railway.
7.4.7 The Grade Separation Proposal would result in vehicles using Granham's Road for access to the A1307, and the Station Road/ Hinton Way would become for local traffic only, with no through-route. The proposal assumes that a bridge or subway for vehicles would be impractical on Station Road/ Hinton Way. The proposal supports a light rail line parallel to the existing and former rail line between Addenbrookes and Granta Park, as originally proposed by Cambridge Connect, Railfuture and UK Tram.
7.4.8 The new public transport route proposed by the GCP requires three at-grade crossing points with existing roads (Babraham Road, Haverhill Road, Hinton Way). These crossings will require full control by traffic lights, and will both slow public transport along the route as well as create additional constraints on vehicular traffic flow. Moreover, every crossing point contributes to additional safety risks.
7.4.9 The Grade Separation Proposal would result in only one at-grade crossing point along the light rail route instead of three, and this would be in the same location as shown by the GCP on Babraham Road. Reducing the number of crossings would significantly improve the speed and safety of the public transport route, and also improve flows for traffic needing to travel to/from the A1307 and Great Shelford.
7.4.10 Cambridge Connect urges the GCP and Combined Authority to give full consideration to the Grade Separation Proposal with a view to examining its delivery in combination with the light rail options presented in our submission following the alignment along the existing and former rail lines through the village of Great Shelford.
7.4.11 Greater consideration needs to be given to the integration of the proposed Cambridge South Station with CSET. The new station needs to be planned taking into consideration the needs for grade separation nearby and potential implications for the Great Shelford Station.


8 Park & Ride proposals by GCP
8.1.1 Cambridge Connect supports some form of new Park & Ride in the general vicinity of Granta Park. It has not been possible for us to make site-specific assessments and therefore cannot recommend one location over another based on site characteristics.
8.1.2 However, as a general principle, it is important that the location selected can be practically integrated with future development of the proposed segregated public transport route to Haverhill, which should be implemented using light rail.
8.1.3 The size and scale of the Park & Ride should be planned in conjunction with delivery of the Granta Park- Haverhill public transport route, because a high proportion of demand for the Park & Ride is likely to arise from residents along this route and from Haverhill. The proposed size of the Park & Ride appears considerably larger than needed, shouId these other considerations be given detailed attention.
8.1.4 In this respect consideration should be given to opportunities for a metro model with more 'distributed Park & Ride' sites, where stops on the metro network accommodate much smaller areas of parking where practical. This approach would reduce demand for very large Park & Ride sites that concentrate high levels of local impacts with large areas of land-take/ usage. Distributed parking at metro stops could result in less intrusive developments for parking, with more pedestrian and cycle access, although it is acknowledged that this could mean more, but smaller, sites.


9 References
Harris, C.M, Brown, I., Cushing, P., Wakefield, P. & Hollinghurst, P. 2019. Greenprint for a sustainable future: Cambridge Light Rail. Report by Cambridge Connect, Railfuture & UK Tram. Available from:
http://www.cambridge-connect.uk/wp-content/up1oads/2019/04/Cambridge-Connect-Greenprint- 30Mar2019-v8-LR.pdf
MacKay, David J.C. 2009. Sustainable energy- without the hot air. UIT Cambridge Ltd, Cambridge. Mott MacDonald. 2019. Technical Note: 'Feasibility of Old Railway Alternative Route' (16 Aug 2019). Mott MacDonald. 2020. CSET Phase 2: Shelford Railway Alignment - Design Development and
Feasibility Assessment (18 May 2020). Report prepared for GCP.
Steer 2019. Cambridgeshire Autonomous Metro Strategic Outline Business Case. Report prepared for the Greater Cambridge Partnership and Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority.
WSP 2018. 'Technical Note: Strategy 1 Route Study'. REF: 70012014-TN-010 Strategy 1 Route Assessment. (13 July 2018).


GCP Busways Light Rail

20 November 2021
SUMMARY     
CONSIDERATION GCP Busways Cambridgeshire Light Rail (CLR)

Network • Where fully segregated, flexibility similar to light rail.
• Where not segregated, buses in congestion, impacting speed / reliability / reputation
• Busway to Waterbeach not needed – use heavy rail connected to light rail within city.
• Slow and congested within city. 
  • Fully segregated – reliable, fast, minimal collision risk.
• Network to Cambourne / Granta Park / Science Park similar.
• Higher ability to generate modal shift (proven).
• 40 km core network covers high demand areas.
• Interchange with buses: integrated ticketing / timetabling.
• Fast, frequent service connects with buses & heavy rail network.

Rubber vs Rails • Standard diesel / hybrid bus; in time battery electric
• Rubber- tyres produced from oil.
• Buses = tyre / road pollution. Not suited to tunnel.
• Buses at metro frequency = potholes.   • Standard technology, proven, highly sophisticated.
• Billions invested in Light Rail Vehicle development.
• Rails address road pothole problems. Excellent in tunnel.
• Rails inflexible, but permanent, encourages investment.

Tunnels • No tunnel currently proposed. Cheaper.
• Surface running – potential congestion.
• City access more difficult if roads closed without a good
alternative.   • Short, simple tunnel (2 portals) to meet essential needs.
• Automatic light rail proven deliverable for tunnel operations.
• Tunnel improves access speed, frequency, reliability, capacity.

Safety • Busway / articulated bus safety lower than light rail.
• Heavy buses at high frequencies impose on cyclists and pedestrians, reducing their safety, especially in city.   • Very safe. Proven over billions of miles.
• Best safety record possible. Segregated way safer in city tunnel.
• Rails add to safety by providing physical guidance.

Environment & Health • Lower energy efficiency = less sustainable.
• Higher particulate pollution from tyres = health risks.
• High volume of waste rubber tyres.
• Higher greenhouse gas emissions over scheme lifetime   • Most energy efficient, less power needed, highly sustainable.
• Lowest possible particulate pollution.
• Superior technical solution for environment / health.
• Lower greenhouse gas emissions over scheme lifetime.

Costs • Lower capex to install segregated roadway.
• Electric buses cheaper.
• Bus lifetimes short – higher materials / carbon / energy.
• Higher opex & high road maintenance costs.   • Higher capex for permanent rails.
• Light Rail Vehicles (LRVs) more expensive.
• LRVs last longer – lower embodied materials / carbon / energy.
• Lower whole-life costs.


Financeability / Economic benefits
• City Deal finance (£500 m) sufficient for several busways.
• Lower investor confidence profile for bus scheme.
• Bus schemes less attractive to investors.
• Gross Value Added lower from bus schemes.
• Lower gains in economic productivity.   • Higher investment needed up front for light rail.
• High investor confidence profile for light rail scheme.
• Proven solution provides investors with confidence.
• Permanent infrastructure provides investor confidence.
• Gross Value Added higher from light rail scheme – more attractive, generates greater associated investment.
• Higher gains in economic productivity.

Delivery of benefits • Modal shift poor compared to light rail.
• Bus mode share ~8% - need to shift to 25-30%.
• Insufficient capacity to meet scale of growth / demands of climate change. Not future-proofed.
• Buses unable to deliver change on scale required.   • Strong modal shift, as evidenced in other cities with light rail.
• Proven, dependable, reliable: deliverable today.
• Attractive and able to deliver change at scale required.
• Future-proofed capacity for growth / Climate Change.

    

GCP Busways

Light rail

• Scheme Profiles
• Comparative Analysis

Scheme profiles – key characteristics
Characteristic GCP Busways Cost (£m) Cambridgeshire Light Rail (CLR) Cost (£m)
Mode Bus with rubber tyres on tarmac or concrete road Light rail vehicle with steel wheels on rails

Power Electric batteries. Recharging at termini / supercapacitors at stops. Charging infrastructure. OLE / ground power supply options not currently
available. Hydrogen potential. Electric Overhead Line Equipment (OLE), with options for Electric ground supply, or batteries charging at termini / supercapacitors at stops. Hydrogen potential.
Guidance Driver steering on roads. Driverless automatic mode possible. Physical steel rails.
Network length1 ~45 km (incl. busway to Waterbeach). (~£11 m/km) 500 ~40 km (including tunnel) (~£25 m/km excl tunnel) ~1432
Tunnel length None ~2.6 km (Phases 1 & 2) (one fifth of CAM) with 2 portals ~273
Segregation Busways fully segregated. City not segregated. Fully segregated >95% of network
Service frequency Assumed ~5-10 mins at peak within city, beyond city
~15 mins ~5 mins within city, ~15 mins beyond city.
Max speed 100 kph (60 mph) 100 kph (60 mph)
Autonomy Driver required. Autonomous operation unknown. Automatic operation available today. Driver optional.
Number of vehicles 200 (@ ~£400K ea) 80 40 (@ ~£2 m ea). 80
Vehicle capacity 50 – 100 100 – 300. Capacity future-proofed.
Vehicle longevity 10 – 12 years (estimated bus life) 25 years (proven) (e.g. DLR vehicle life up to ~30 yrs)
Vehicle length / width 9 – 12 m / 2.2 – 2.7 m 18 – 37 m / 2.4 – 2.7 m
Vehicle weight 7.5 – 13 tonnes dependent on length 16 – 20 tonnes dependent on length
City stops Unknown 22
Underground stations None x1 (City Centre) ~100
Depots x2 (owing to number of buses required) ? x1 40
Operating costs ~£4.00 per vehicle kilometre (estimate)2 30 pa ~£5.00 per vehicle kilometre3 40 pa

1. Based on average UK scheme costs (excluding DLR; Ref 18) scaled to 2019 prices , multiplied by an optimism bias of 1.4. Half of this cost (£15 m per km) has been estimated for busway conversion since many costs will not be required (eg alignment, moving services, land purchases, etc.).
2. Operating costs uncertain. Eg, road maintenance. is excluded for buses, while for light rail it is included. A true comparison is needed, taking into account road maintenance, which is significant.
3. Based on Metrolink & others analysed by P. Cushing 2019. NB: DLR & Metrolink operate at profit, Nottingham NET breaks even. Revenue-earning capacity needs to be taken into account.

Scheme profiles – network maps

GCP Busways Cambridgeshire Light Rail (CLR)
Existing busway Proposed busway Heavy railway

CITY


REGION


GCP Busways

Light rail

• Scheme Profiles
• Comparative Analysis

NETWORK

    

RUBBER vs RAILS

Poor Weak Average

Good Excellent


CONSIDERATION GCP Busways Cambridgeshire Light Rail (CLR) Ref.


Maintenance • Road wear: proportional to the fourth power of axle weight. Wear exacerbated by high frequency.
• Repetitive tracking on single path (e.g. optical guideway) exacerbates wear, with constant potholing (e.g. Caen rubber-tyred ‘guided buses’ beset by road maintenance problems – unreliability & high costs led to replacement by light rail).
• Road maintenance costs; not clear whether road maintenance included in busway costings.
• Cambridge Guided Busway: major maintenance needed after 8 y, despite theoretical 40 y lifetime.
• Maintenance costs need to be accounted for in the whole-life cost appraisal of buses.


• Rail / trackbed transfers vehicle loads using well-understood engineering.
• Rail engineering proven to be durable and effective over
hundreds of years of experience.
• Rails address the road wear problem.
• Rail maintenance required but comparatively less.
• Rail maintenance costs are accounted for in budgets and paid out of operational revenues.
• Light rail is replacing busways where whole-life costs are taken into account.

1

Autonomous operation
• Autonomous operation delivery unknown.  
• Automatic operation deliverable today. Autonomous rail vehicles likely deliverable before road because of physical guidance.

Friction / efficiency
• High tyre friction; low energy efficiency.   • Very low friction; most energy efficient.
• Steel wheels on rails have ~15% of the rolling resistance of rubber tyred vehicles.
2

Power requirement • Significantly more power required to deliver an equivalent service level owing to substantially lower energy efficiency of rubber-tyred vehicles.
• Higher power requirements inflates operational costs.   • Light rail requires the lowest possible power to deliver the required service level because of its high efficiency.
• Less energy required to run light rail vehicles than buses to deliver the same service level.
2

Resuspension of Particulates • Approx 27% of non-exhaust particulates are derived from resuspension of particles along route.
• Large tyre > road contact surface increases particulate resuspension and recycles harmful pollutants into air.  
• Lowest possible contact area of wheel to rail (size of 5p piece) – particulate resuspension lower.
13

Passenger experience • High ride quality claimed but road subject to wear / potholes over time, leading to deterioration in quality; impacts on passenger satisfaction with ride.  
• High ride quality proven and consistent over lifetime of rail light rail vehicle with appropriate maintenance. 1, 15,
16, 17,
18

Flexibility • Flexibility to operate on normal roads using a standard bus.
• More flexible in theory but unsuited to mass transit.   • Less flexible as light rail operates only on permanent track
• Specialised system that delivers mass transit very well

TUNNELS

Poor Weak Average

Good Excellent


CONSIDERATION GCP Busways Cambridgeshire Light Rail (CLR) Ref.


Tunnel Configuration

• None, surface only.  • One simple linear tunnel with two portals.
• Tunnel length ~2.6 km (Phases 1 & 2).
• Tunnels size to meet legal and safety requirements. Diameter twin-bore ~4 -5 m OR single bore ~8 m.
• Includes 800 mm side access way
• Standard twin or single bore tunnel.

8, 9

Capacity • Operating at surface impacts other users such as pedestrians, cyclists, deliveries, etc.
• Surface operation has capacity constraints for future.  
• Tunnel capacity future-proofed.



Safety
• Elevated safety risks of large vehicles at surface for pedestrians / cyclists.
• Cyclists, pedestrians and car drivers are regularly injured and some have been killed by buses on the Cambridge busways  

• Safety proven worldwide and UK (e.g. DLR).
• Very low risk – rails provide physical guidance, proven safe.
• In-tunnel 800 mm wide along-track accessway assumed.



Tunnel operations


• N/A  • Low particulate emissions and zero engine emissions make
light rail better suited to use inside confined tunnel space.
• Lower heat venting needed without rubber tyres.
• Twin bore tunnel would have cross passage linkages and comply with legal, safety and practical requirements.
• Need for escape routes, but short tunnel length and simple configuration.

Heritage / urban realm • Heavy transport infrastructure at surface negatively impacts on city heritage /urban realm by bus congestion.
• Surface pollution increases with bus emissions from tailpipes, tyre and brake wear, degrading urban realm.  
• Protects heritage / urban realm by placing heavy transport infrastructure underground.


Tunnel cost

• Zero  

• Expensive, but benefits very high.

ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY & HUMAN HEALTH

    


CONSIDERATION GCP Busways Cambridgeshire Light Rail (CLR) Ref.

Energy Efficiency • ~ Double the energy requirements.
• Regenerative braking transfers energy back to power plant.
• Battery will wear out / lose capacity over time.   • Rail is most energy efficient form of mass transit.
• Low energy requirement is significant cost saving: energy consumption accounts for large proportion of operational costs.
• Regenerative braking transfers energy back to power plant.
2


Emissions & Particulate Pollution • Zero emissions from electric motor at point of operation.
• Particulate pollution from tyre, road & brake wear.
• Particulates elevated by heavy vehicles and tyre footprint.
• Fine particulates harmful to human health –as important as tail pipe emissions.
• Microplastics from tyres discharged into water / ecosystems.  
• Zero emissions from electric motor at point of operation.
• Low levels of particulate pollution from rail / wheel / brake wear.
• Lower levels of fine particulates.
• Best option for human health.

3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 13


Waste & sustainability • Thousands of waste tyres, which may be recycled into other uses, including burning for fuel, though energy inefficient.
• Battery waste disposal may be significant issue.
• Raw materials for batteries are non-renewable.   • Low waste. Durable. Steel recyclable.
• If OLE used, no waste batteries, and power can be sourced from sustainable, renewable sources.
• Longer vehicle life = more sustainable use of materials / embodied energy.

Noise • Electric vehicles low noise – rubber tyre roar at speed.
• Improvement on diesel buses.   • Electric vehicles low noise – rail screech if not well-maintained.
• Improvement on diesel buses and on rubber-tyred vehicles.

Carbon Footprint
• If segregated, road & guideways may result in more construction carbon.   • Rails may elevate construction carbon cf roadway structures.
• Carbon-free steel is being manufactured today.
• Low-carbon cement could be considered for tunnel.



12
• Modal shift offsets construction carbon and carbon from energy consumed. Modal shift lower than light rail.
• Higher operational carbon emissions owing to lower energy
efficiency, depending on power sources.   • Modal shift offsets construction carbon and carbon from energy consumed. Modal shift more certain.
• Lower operational carbon owing to higher energy efficiency, depending on power sources.
• Carbon footprint lower than BRT over scheme lifetime.



Collision Risk
• Busway safety lower than light rail. No physical guides.   • Segregated operation minimises collision risk / lowers costs.
• Accidents risks very low – one of safest modes that exists.
• Light rail one of the safest forms of public transport. 15x safer than buses, and 24x safer than cars.
• Operational speed, reliability, revenue and reputation all maintained at high levels.



10
• Collision risk elevated on shared roads. “Collisions in shared road space are a significant operational cost.”
• Elevated risks of injury / death on shared road spaces
• Speed, reliability, revenue & reputation suffer from collisions. 

Visual Impact • Concrete / tarmac roadway including cuttings, and potential structures for guidance, signs etc.   • OLE catenaries, if used, and tracks including cuttings.
• Catenary not required if ground feed or battery adopted (hybrid approach could minimise visual intrusion in sensitive areas).

COSTS & ECONOMIC BENEFITS

Poor Weak Average

Good Excellent


CONSIDERATION GCP Busways Cambridgeshire Light Rail (CLR) Ref.


Overall cost & risk
• £500 m for partially segregated network.
• Lower cost but unlikely to deliver modal shift required or economic benefits at the same level as light rail.  
• ~£1.3 – 1.7 bn for Phase 1 & 2 network.
• Proven technology deliverable, low financial risk.
• More costly, but greater benefits.
9, 15, 16,
17, 18

Tunnel cost & risk • Zero cost, but risks lack of capacity, poor connectivity
and impacts on urban realm, heritage and amenity.   • ~£273 m for 2.6 km tunnel with 2 portals.
• Simple short tunnel to reduce costs.
• Tunnel size and costs predictable / low risk.
9

Underground station cost
• Zero.   • ~£100 m per station.
• 1 station proposed.
9


Segregated way
costs
• Capital investment lower for existing roads.  

• Initial capital investment in steel track higher.
• Whole life costs more favourable (see below).

• Capital investment significant for segregated bus roads. 

Vehicle costs • ~£200K-£400K per electric bus.
• Shorter quoted vehicle life.   • ~£2 m per vehicle (costs vary in competitive market)
• Proven long vehicle life (e.g. DLR).
9


Operational costs • Operational road maintenance costs will be high.
• More power needed to deliver service, escalating operational costs.
• Replacement tyres elevate operational costs.
• Autonomous operation not currently deliverable, necessitating drivers and increased staff costs.   • Lower operational costs (eg. lower power requirements, no waste tyres, longer vehicle life, high durability of permanent way).
• Automatic operation currently deliverable, which could reduce need for drivers and staff costs.


Economic benefits • Lower Gross Value Added to economy.
• Lower Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR).
• Lower efficiency (poor ridership levels).
• Low economic productivity gains (less congestion with
modestly improved public transport links)   • Higher Gross Value Added to economy.
• Higher Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR).
• Improved efficiency.
• High economic productivity gains (higher modal shift & less congestion with great public transport links)

FINANCEABILITY, DELIVERABILITY

Poor Weak Average

Good Excellent


CONSIDERATION GCP Busways Cambridgeshire Light Rail (CLR) Ref.

Investor confidence
• City Deal finance in place.   • Modern, standardised technologies, inter-operable
• Proven modern technology = low risk.
• Higher investor confidence.
• City Deal finance re-purposed will build investor confidence.


Operational Revenue

• Buses unlikely to attract strong operational revenue.   • Likely higher farebox revenues as light rail will generate greater modal shift than buses.
• Rail greater “trip generative effect” than guided bus.
• Link with bus services at periphery to stimulate those services, not compete with them.
15, 16,
17, 18

3rd Party Revenue Potential
• Lower potential revenue with bus-based brand  
• Higher potential revenue opportunities (vehicle advertising / station naming rights) from higher quality image.

Land Value Capture
• Appeal poor, so land value uplift poor.  
• Permanence attractive for housebuilders, investors and buyers.
11, 19


Legal Approvals
• Approvals straightforward in principle.
• In practice, strong community opposition and Public Inquiry challenges are likely.   • Light rail network deliverable via standard, well established Transport & Works Act Order procedures.
• Tunnel operation straightforward in terms of legal / safety approvals as already proven (e.g. DLR).
• Strong community support likely.



Deliverability • Proven technology.
• Practicality of non-segregated way in city not clear – bus congestion.
• Greater power needs raise questions about power supply availability and upgrades to support frequent electric bus services (assumes all buses are powered by rechargeable electric batteries).
• Deliverable within available City Deal finance.

 • Proven technology; many recent precedents; clear process for consents; proven passenger attraction; etc.
• Power supply upgrades may be needed.
• More attractive to investors because of proven record with highly positive public reputation.
• Raising finance still challenging, but City Deal could fund a significant proportion, leaving ~£1 bn to raise.

OVERALL SUMMARY     
CONSIDERATION GCP Busways Cambridgeshire Light Rail (CLR)



Network • Where fully segregated, flexibility similar to light rail.
• Where not segregated, buses in congestion, impacting speed / reliability / reputation
• Busway to Waterbeach not needed – use heavy rail connected to light rail within city.
• Slow and congested within city. 
  • Fully segregated – reliable, fast, minimal collision risk.
• Network to Cambourne / Granta Park / Science Park similar.
• Higher ability to generate modal shift (proven).
• 40 km core network covers high demand areas.
• Interchange with buses: integrated ticketing / timetabling.
• Fast, frequent service connects with buses & heavy rail network.

Rubber vs Rails • Standard diesel / hybrid bus; in time battery electric
• Rubber- tyres produced from oil.
• Buses = tyre / road pollution. Poor in tunnel.
• Buses at metro frequency = potholes.   • Standard technology, proven, highly sophisticated.
• Billions invested in Light Rail Vehicle development.
• Rails address road pothole problems. Excellent in tunnel.
• Rails inflexible, but permanent, encourages investment.

Tunnels • No tunnel currently proposed. Cheaper.
• Surface running – potential congestion.
• City access more difficult if roads closed without a good
alternative.   • Short, simple tunnel (2 portals) to meet essential needs.
• Automatic light rail proven deliverable for tunnel operations.
• Tunnel improves access speed, frequency, reliability, capacity.

Safety • Busway / articulated bus safety lower than light rail.
• Heavy buses at high frequencies impose on cyclists and pedestrians, reducing their safety, especially in city.   • Very safe. Proven over billions of miles.
• Best safety record possible. Segregated way safer in city tunnel.
• Rails add to safety by providing physical guidance.

Environment & Health • Lower energy efficiency = less sustainable.
• Higher particulate pollution from tyres = health risks.
• High volume of waste rubber tyres.
• Higher greenhouse gas emissions over scheme lifetime   • Most energy efficient, less power needed, highly sustainable.
• Lowest possible particulate pollution.
• Superior technical solution for environment / health.
• Lower greenhouse gas emissions over scheme lifetime.

Costs • Lower capex to install segregated roadway.
• Electric buses cheaper.
• Bus lifetimes short – higher materials / carbon / energy.
• Higher opex & high road maintenance costs.   • Higher capex for permanent rails.
• Light Rail Vehicles (LRVs) more expensive.
• LRVs last longer – lower embodied materials / carbon / energy.
• Lower whole-life costs.



Financeability / Economic benefits
• City Deal finance (£500 m) sufficient for several busways.
• Lower investor confidence profile for bus scheme.
• Bus schemes less attractive to investors.
• Gross Value Added lower from bus schemes.
• Lower gains in economic productivity.   • Higher investment needed up front for light rail.
• High investor confidence profile for light rail scheme.
• Proven solution provides investors with confidence.
• Permanent infrastructure provides investor confidence.
• Gross Value Added higher from light rail scheme – more attractive, generates greater associated investment.
• Higher gains in economic productivity.


Delivery Risk • Modal shift poor compared to light rail.
• Bus mode share ~8% - need to shift to 25-30%.
• Insufficient capacity to meet scale of growth / demands of climate change. Not future-proofed.
• Buses unable to deliver change on scale required.   • Strong modal shift, as evidenced in other cities with light rail.
• Proven, dependable, reliable: deliverable today.
• Attractive and able to deliver change at scale required.
• Future-proofed capacity for growth / Climate Change.

References

Ref Source / Evidence / More Info
1 Caen, France: guided bus caused excessive road wear / maintenance costs / frequent disruption – replaced by light rail.
2 MacKay, David J.C. 2009. Sustainable energy – without the hot air. UIT Cambridge Ltd, Cambridge.

3 Amato, F., Flemming R. Cassee, Hugo A.C. Denier van der Gon, Robert Gehrig, Mats Gustafsson, Wolfgang Hafner, Roy M. Harrison, Magdalena Jozwicka, Frank J. Kelly, Teresa Moreno, Andre S.H. Prevot, Martijn Schaap, Jordi Sunyer, Xavier Querol. 2014. Urban air quality: The challenge of traffic non-exhaust emissions.
Journal of Hazardous Materials 275: 31-36.
4 Grigoratos, T. & Martini, G. 2014. Non-exhaust traffic related emissions. Brake and tyre wear PM. Literature review. Joint Research Centre, Institute of Energy
and Transport, European Commission, Luxembourg.
5 Hann, S., Darrah, C., Sherrington, C., Blacklaws, K., Horton, I. & Thompson, A. 2018. Reducing Household Contributions to Marine Plastic Pollution. Report for Friends of the Earth by Eunomia Research & Consulting. FoE and ERC, Bristol.
6 Barlow, T. 2014. Briefing paper on non-exhaust particulate emissions from road transport. Transport Research Laboratory. Client Project Report CPR1976.
7 Amato, F. (Ed) 2018. Non-Exhaust Emissions. An urban air quality problem for public health impact and mitigation measures. Academic Press, Elsevier.
8 Steer 2018. Greater Cambridge Mass Transit Options Assessment Report. Report prepared for the Greater Cambridge Partnership and Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority.
9 Steer 2019. Cambridgeshire Autonomous Metro Strategic Outline Business Case. Report prepared for the Greater Cambridge Partnership and Cambridgeshire
and Peterborough Combined Authority.
10 Scott Ith, Transport Director, Salt Lake City Tramway – pers. comm. 2017.
11 TfL 2017. Land Value Capture: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/land_value_capture_report_annexes_transport_for_london.pdf

12 European Environment Agency 2019. Specific CO2 emissions per passenger-km and per mode of transport in Europe. https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and- maps/daviz/specific-co2-emissions-per-passenger-3#tab-chart_1

13 Lawrence et al., 2013 Source apportionment of traffic emissions of particulate matter using tunnel measurements. Atmospheric Environment 77: 548-557.
14 CPIER (Cambridgeshire & Peterborough Independent Economic Review) 2018. Final Report
15 Knowles, R. & Ferbrache, F. 2014. An investigation into the Economic Impacts on Cities of Investment in Light Rail Systems. UKTram, June 2014.
16 APPLRG (All Party Parliamentary Light Rail Group/pteg) 2010. Light Rail & the City Regions inquiry: Final Report February 2010.
17 Steer Davies Gleave / PTEG. 2005. What light rail can do for cities: a review of the evidence. Final Report February 2005.
18 DfT (Department for Transport) 2011. Green light for light rail. Report on light rail by the UK DfT.
19 Suzuki, H., Murakami J., Hong Y-H, & Tamayose B. 2015. Financing Transit-Oriented Development with Land Values. World Bank: Urban Development Series.

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