Greater Cambridge Local Plan: Proposed Submission

The Plan should require the forecast of 73,300 additional jobs to be independently reviewed and sensitivity-tested against current labour-market evidence and a range of plausible assumptions about AI, automation and productivity growth. This analysis should distinguish clearly between economic growth and employment growth, particularly in knowledge-intensive sectors. The employment forecast, and the housing, employment-land and infrastructure requirements that depend upon it, should then be revised where necessary to reflect the results. The Plan should not proceed on the assumption that historic relationships between economic growth and job creation will necessarily continue to 2045.

Robustness of the employment-growth assumptions: the Plan is not sound in respect of its employment-growth assumptions because those assumptions have not been adequately demonstrated to be “justified”.

I question whether the evidence base adequately demonstrates the robustness of the assumption that Greater Cambridge will generate approximately 73,300 additional jobs between 2024 and 2045.

The Employment and Housing Needs Update 2025 identifies its Central scenario as the most likely outcome, forecasting approximately 3,500 additional jobs per annum over the plan period. The subsequent June 2026 Review of Economic Data, Context and Representations nevertheless acknowledges that recent employment performance has been considerably weaker: BRES data show no employment growth between 2023 and 2024 and average growth of only 0.6% per annum over the latest five-year period. The Review also records baseline forecasts of approximately 0.6% from Cambridge Econometrics and 0.8% from Experian, compared with the 1.3% long-term growth assumed by the preferred Local Plan scenario.

I recognise that a Local Plan must take a long-term view and that Greater Cambridge has exceptional economic strengths. My concern is therefore not that continued economic growth is implausible. Rather, it is whether the evidence sufficiently demonstrates that economic and productivity growth will translate into the assumed scale of employment growth over a period extending to 2045.

This distinction has become particularly important because of the rapid development and adoption of artificial intelligence.

AI is recognised within the evidence base principally as an economic opportunity for Greater Cambridge, including through the strength of its technology cluster. However, AI is also capable of increasing labour productivity and changing the employment intensity of economic activity. This is particularly relevant given that a substantial proportion of the forecast employment growth is concentrated in knowledge-intensive sectors, including professional services/R&D, IT services, architectural and engineering services, and head offices and management consultancy.

It is therefore not sufficient simply to identify AI and digital technology as growth sectors. The relevant question for a Local Plan forecasting numbers of jobs is also whether AI and automation could alter the historical relationship between economic growth, business growth, floorspace requirements and employment.

Indeed, the Employment and Housing Needs Update itself recognises, in its discussion of employment floorspace, that conventional forecasting models can become less effective as floorspace and job densities change and as productivity-related investment in space and plant does not necessarily result in labour growth. A comparable uncertainty appears to arise from AI-driven productivity improvements.

I have not identified within the evidence base an explicit sensitivity analysis which tests the preferred 73,300-job forecast against different plausible assumptions concerning AI, automation and labour-productivity growth.

This matters because the employment scenarios rely substantially upon historic sectoral performance and the continuation, albeit moderated, of previous absolute rates of employment growth. AI represents a plausible structural change which may make historic relationships between output and employment less reliable as a guide to the period to 2045.

I therefore consider that the employment evidence should be supplemented by an explicit productivity/AI sensitivity analysis. This should distinguish clearly between:
- growth in GVA and business activity;
- growth in employment;
- growth in labour productivity; and
- demand for different forms of employment floorspace.

Such analysis need not assume that AI will reduce overall employment. The future effect is inherently uncertain and AI may itself create substantial new employment in Greater Cambridge. That uncertainty is precisely why alternative scenarios should be tested.

Without such sensitivity testing, I am not persuaded that the evidence base has adequately demonstrated that the preferred forecast of approximately 73,300 additional jobs — and the housing and employment-land assumptions linked to that forecast — is sufficiently robust over the full period to 2045.